SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE

FIRST STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

PART I

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

  1. This First Statement of the Government of Israel is presented to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee ("the Committee") in response to the Committee's request to receive an initial submission from each side by 30 December 2000. Given the short timeframe placed by the Committee on the preparation of this submission, this Statement is limited to providing an overview of Israel's position. Israel will be pleased to expand upon the issues addressed herein, as well as to address any other relevant matters, in later submissions to the Committee.

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    A. Establishment of the Committee
     

  3. The Committee was established pursuant to the agreement of the Government of the State of Israel ("Israel") and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation ("PLO"), as the recognised representative of the Palestinian people in the peace process with Israel, reached at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit on 16-17 October 2000. The essential scope of the Committee's task was described in the statement of President Clinton following that Summit in the following terms:

  4.   "... the United States will develop with the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence.

    The committee's report will be shared by the US President with the UN Secretary-General and the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the US President for publication."
     

    Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, Statement of President Clinton, 17 October 2000. (Annex I, Tab 1)
     
  5. In accordance with this agreement, the Committee was established in early-November 2000 under the chairmanship of former US Senator George Mitchell. The other members of the Committee are former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjorn Jagland, former US Senator Warren Rudman and European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

  6.  
  7. In correspondence with Senator Mitchell, President Clinton elaborated upon the task of the Committee in the following terms:

  8.   "The Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee is being established to provide an objective study of the events since late September involving violence in Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Committee should focus on the problem of violent confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians and the policies and practices of the two sides during the crisis. It should, in particular, provide an assessment of exactly what has happened, why it has happened, and how to prevent its recurrence. The Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future.

    The methodology of the Committee's work, including how to gather the information necessary to complete its task, will be left to the Committee's judgment. The Committee may, after consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, appoint experts to assist in its work. The two sides have also confirmed to me their intent to cooperate with the Committee. When the Committee believes it has sufficient information it should prepare a written report, which it is hoped can be completed in the first half of 2001. In accordance with the understandings reached at Sharm El-Sheikh, the report will be shared by the US President with the UN Secretary-General and the two sides before the President makes it public. This will allow the Committee to examine any additional suggestions before finalising its report.

    The Committee should seek to operate by consensus to the maximum extent possible. This will lend greater authority to its findings and recommendations."
     

    Draft undated letter from President Clinton to Senator Mitchell. (Annex I, Tab 2)
     
  9. Before turning to outline the essential elements of Israel's position on the matters under consideration, two preliminary observations are warranted. First, Israel welcomes the establishment and distinguished membership of the Committee. Insofar as it is able to do so, Israel will seek to facilitate the completion of the Committee's task expeditiously. Israel hopes that the work of the Committee will contribute to the rebuilding of links between the two sides.

  10.  
  11. Second, Israel notes the commitment of the two sides at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit "to take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation, eliminate points of friction, ensure an end of violence and incitement, maintain calm and prevent recurrence of recent events". The ending of violence and forward movement in the peace process are Israel's principal aims. These are not, however, matters which Israel can achieve on its own - although it will do all that it can towards these ends.

  12.  

     

    B. Terms of reference
     

  13. Express terms of reference for the Committee's work have not been adopted. This is not ideal. The basis of the Committee's work is the agreement of the Parties at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit and this alone. The scope of the Committee's task as an expression of that agreement ought to be clearly stated.

  14.  
  15. In the absence of express terms of reference, Israel considers that the task of the Committee is described by reference to the letter from President Clinton to Senator Mitchell extracted above. The task of the Committee is thus to provide an objective study of the events in question and, in particular, to provide an assessment of exactly what happened, why it happened, and how to prevent its recurrence. While Israel is confident of the strength of its case, the Committee is not a tribunal adjudicating on differences between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Its role is not to adjudge culpability or liability. Nor is the Committee's role to make wider recommendations for a settlement between the Parties. As expressed by President Clinton, the Committee "should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future."

  16.  
  17. In this regard, the Committee should take particular care to avoid, both by its procedures and by its Report, any widening or internationalisation of the dispute between the Parties. The risk is that internationalisation of the process through the work or recommendations of the Committee could bring about a further polarisation of the Parties and lay the groundwork for the resort to violence in the future.

  18.  

     

    C. Working procedures
     

  19. The task of the Committee is to provide an objective study of the events of recent weeks. This requires the Committee to proceed on the basis of working procedures that are both transparent and unimpeachable in their fairness towards both sides. Such procedures will be fundamental to the perceived fairness, in due course, of the Committee's Report.
  20. The Committee has yet to adopt such procedures. Israel considers that this element of the Committee's work should be addressed as a matter of priority. Israel has already raised in correspondence with the Committee various issues concerning its working procedures which Israel considers should be addressed expressly at the outset of the Committee's work. To facilitate this, Israel has suggested that the Committee convene a procedural meeting of the Parties, either jointly or separately, to address such matters.
  21. Two elements relating to the Committee's working procedures call for particular comment. First, Israel considers that, to ensure the fairness of the Committee's working methods and of its Report, the Committee ought to adopt, in agreement with the two sides, appropriate procedures relating to the interviewing of individuals and the gathering of information. Proposals have already been advanced by Israel in respect of this element. They need not be rehearsed here. It suffices to say that Israel considers that the adoption of fair and transparent working procedures dealing with this element is essential.
  22. Second, Israel considers that the maintenance of objectivity in the discharge of the Committee's task requires that both Parties should be provided with copies of, and have an opportunity to comment on, all statements, documents and other materials that are put before the Committee, from whatever source. Israel has no wish to limit the sources of information from which the Committee can draw. The opportunity to comment on material on which the Committee may draw for the purposes of its Report is, however, a fundamental element of procedural fairness.
  23. In this regard, Israel reiterates that the present Statement is an initial presentation of Israel's position on the matters with which the Committee is concerned. Obviously, it is not a response to any statement by the other side. This being so, Israel expects that the Committee will provide both sides with a reasonable opportunity to develop their positions in greater detail where they consider it appropriate to do so and to comment on the statements and associated documentation submitted by the other side.

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    D. The scope of the Committee's task

  25. By reference to President Clinton's letter to Senator Mitchell quoted above, there are four principal elements with which the Committee will be concerned: (a) the causes of the current violence, (b) the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in respect of these events, (c) the policies and practices of Israel in respect of these events, and (d) recommendations to prevent the recurrence of such violence in the future. Each of these elements is addressed in the main body of this Statement.

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    E. Summary of Israel's position

  27. Israel did not seek the present confrontation. It was, and continues to be, imposed upon Israel by the Palestinian side. Within the severe constraints of the events of recent weeks, Israel's actions have been directed towards containing the confrontation, protecting persons not directly involved in the conflict and their property, and avoiding casualties to its military and police personnel in the performance of their task. Israel has also been concerned to minimise serious injury to those actively engaged on the Palestinian side.
  28. While it has not always been possible, in the extreme circumstances of the on-going violence, to meet all of these objectives, Israel firmly maintains that it has acted in a measured and responsible fashion in the circumstances.

  29.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (i) The nature of the conflict

  30. Over the past 93 days, there have been around 2,700 live-fire incidents of unprovoked attacks initiated by Palestinians against Israeli civilians, police and soldiers involving the use of automatic weapons, assault rifles, pistols, hand grenades and other weapons. This amounts to around 28 such incidents a day. The scale and intensity of these attacks has been such as to amount to an armed conflict short of war. These incidents have, more often than not, taken the form of attacks involving significant numbers of Palestinians against relatively small numbers of Israeli police or soldiers. They have taken place in areas from which Israel has been progressively withdrawing over recent years in accordance with the agreements concluded between the two sides as part of the peace process. The attacks have thus involved the threat and use of lethal force by Palestinians against Israelis who have been both numerically and geographically vulnerable.

  31.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (ii) The cause of the violence

  32. There is a long-standing dispute between the two sides. Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, been steady progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement without the resort to violence on a scale that has characterised recent weeks. While the underlying dispute is part of the background of the present conflict, it is not the immediate cause of the violence.
  33. At its most basic, the violence of the past 93 days is the result of the failure, and indeed refusal, of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority to comply with their essential responsibilities, pursuant to the various agreements concluded with Israel, to take such measures as are necessary to forestall acts of violence and terror against Israel and Israelis. These responsibilities were, from Israel's perspective, the central element of the Palestinian commitments to Israel in the peace process.
  34. More fundamentally, the violation on the part of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority of their security responsibilities towards Israel has been a feature of a broader campaign orchestrated by the Palestinian leadership to regain the diplomatic initiative in the wake of the widely held perception in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the failure of the Camp David Summit in July 2000. There is evidence of long-term preparation by elements within the Palestinian leadership to provoke just such a confrontation. Members of the Palestinian Police, established pursuant to the agreements with Israel, have actively engaged in attacks on Israelis. Detainees responsible for some of the most horrific terrorist attacks against Israelis, held in prisons controlled by the Palestinian Authority, were released prematurely to take an active role in the conflict.
  35. The violence of recent weeks has thus been part of a calculated policy of the Palestinian leadership in respect of the conduct of its relations with Israel and a direct consequence of the failure on the part of the Palestinian leadership to fulfil its existing commitments and responsibilities to prevent and forestall such violence.

  36.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iii) Palestinian policies and practices

    (a) The exploitation of children

  37. One of the most disturbing elements of the conflict has been the active involvement on the Palestinian side of children in attacks of the utmost violence directed against Israelis. This has included the practice of armed Palestinians firing at Israelis from within or behind crowds of demonstrators, including children. The Palestinian leadership, Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Police are under a positive obligation to restrain the involvement of children in such episodes. They have done virtually nothing towards this end. On the contrary, there is evidence of active and long-term encouragement by the Palestinian leadership of the participation of children in the violence.

  38.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (b) Violence directed against Israeli civilians

  39. The violence has also involved the active targeting by Palestinians of Israeli civilians who were in no manner involved in the conflict. This targeting of passive Israeli civilians in their homes, while travelling or while otherwise engaged in civilian pursuits detached from the conflict is a significant point of distinction between the practices of the two sides. Whereas Palestinian civilians injured by Israeli action have by-and-large been actively engaged or caught up in some manner in the confrontation with Israel, Israeli civilians injured in the conflict have in the overwhelming majority of cases been targeted merely because they were Israelis.

  40.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (c) Barbarism

  41. The violence has also been marked by acts of appalling brutality by the Palestinian side. The barbarism of the lynching of the two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah on 12 October 2000 left no-one in doubt about the nature of the threat faced by Israelis. The destructive intent shown by Palestinians to Jewish Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control further illustrates the uncompromising attitudes that appears to underlie the Palestinian attacks. These events have not been a protest. They have been unrestrained attacks of the utmost ferocity.

  42.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (d) Incitement

  43. Hostile propaganda and an incitement to violence has been a constant feature both of the period leading up to the start of the violence in late-September 2000 and throughout its course. Calls to Palestinians to kill Jews and Israelis have been made by both Palestinian religious and political leaders and broadcast live on Palestinian television. Children's school books glorify confrontation with Israel. "Slitting the throats of Israelis" is a rehearsed drill taught to Palestinian children at "summer camps" organised by Yasser Arafat's Fatah party.

  44.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (e) The unwarranted release of terrorist detainees

  45. The Palestinian Authority is under an obligation to detain those involved or suspected of involvement in attacks against Israelis. In practice, however, it has pursued a "revolving door" policy, releasing convicted or suspected terrorists soon after arrest. In the period following the failure of the Camp David Summit, around 50 such detainees were released. A further 80 or so were released after the start of the violence. Many have played an active role in the conflict.

  46.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (f) The failure to confiscate illegal weapons

  47. The Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Police are under an obligation to confiscate illegal weapons. This obligation has been revisited and endorsed in virtually every agreement concluded between Israel and the Palestinians. No attempt has been made by the Palestinian side to honour this commitment. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are awash with illegal weapons, including machine guns, hand grenades, explosives and others. These are the weapons used by the Palestinian side against Israelis in the present conflict.

  48.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iv) Israeli policies and practices

  49. The current violence is in no way akin to a civilian riot. Riot control techniques that may be used effectively to contain and minimise casualties in civil disturbances involving non-lethal acts of violence are fundamentally inadequate for purposes of containing live-fire confrontations such as those with which the Committee is concerned. In such circumstances, there is a real threat to the lives of military and police personnel. Even assuming that steps can be taken to reduce such threats by the use of protective measures such as body armour, such personnel cannot get within sufficient range to engage in traditional riot control measures.
  50. The live-fire dimension of the Palestinian attacks decisively took the present confrontation out of the realm of civilian riot control and located it within the sphere of an armed conflict. In the circumstances of this conflict - involving around 9,000 attacks by Palestinians against Israelis, including around 2,700 live-fire attacks - Israel considers that it acted in a measured and responsible manner.

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    (v) Recommendations to prevent the recurrence of violence

  52. On the issue of recommendations to prevent the recurrence of violence, Israel considers that, in the first instance, previously agreed arrangements between the two sides to uphold security and facilitate security cooperation must be given effect. The only secure basis on which to move forward is the full and effective implementation of the agreements already concluded between the Parties. Beyond this, Israel considers that the existing arrangements can and should be strengthened. Proposals to this end are set out in Part VIII of this Statement.

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    F. A brief chronology of events

  54. In the event that it may be helpful for purposes of orientation, the following is a brief chronology of recent events:
  55. 11 - 25 July 2000 Camp David Summit
    26 July - 21 August Extended foreign trip by Arafat - he is advised not to declare a Palestinian State on 13 September
    6 September Clinton meeting with Barak and Arafat in New York at UN Millennium Summit
    10 September Palestinian Council delays unilateral declaration of statehood
    27 September Bomb attack against Israelis at Netzarim Junction
    28 September Visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount
    29 September Israeli police officer killed in Kalkilya, West Bank
    Violent clashes on the Temple Mount and elsewhere
    4 October Paris Summit - Barak and Arafat meet French President Chirac and US Secretary of State Albright
    7 October Destruction of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus
    12 October Lynching of Israeli reservists in Ramallah
    Destruction of the Shalom al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho
    16 - 17 October Sharm El-Sheikh Summit
    21 - 22 October League of Arab States Summit, Cairo
    1 November Peres - Arafat Meeting
    2 November Car bomb attack in Jerusalem
    9 November Meeting between Clinton and Arafat
    13 November Meeting between Clinton and Barak
    20 November Bomb attack against Israeli school bus at Kfar Darom
    22 November Car bomb attack in Hadera
    late December 2000 Formal resumption of the peace negotiations

    G. The contents of the present Statement

  56. Against this background, Israel's Statement proceeds by way of the following additional parts:
  57. II. Background Issues: the Peace Process and Existing Commitments
    III. The Permanent Status Negotiations and the Failure of Camp David
    IV. The Immediate Causes of the Conflict
    V. What Happened: An Outline of Events
    VI. Palestinian Policies and Practices
    VII. Israeli Policies and Practices
    VIII. Recommendations to Prevent the Recurrence of Violence
    IX. Conclusions

     
  58. Attached to this Statement is an Appendix containing the following maps and aerial photographs:

  59.  

     
     
     
     
     

    Note: Some of the maps and photos are currently unavailable online.
     
     
    Map No.1 General Orientation Map
    (see Israel within Boundaries and Ceasefire Lines)
    Map No.2 West Bank - Major Flashpoints of Conflict
    Map No.3 Gaza Strip - Major Flashpoints of Conflict
    Aerial Photograph No.1 Temple Mount (showing route of Sharon visit)
    Aerial Photograph No.2A Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip
    Aerial Photograph No.2B Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip
    Aerial Photograph No.3A Ayosh Junction, West Bank
    Aerial Photograph No.3B Ayosh Junction, West Bank
    Aerial Photograph No.4 Gilo - Beit Jalla area

  60. Together with this Statement, Israel is also submitting the following accompanying materials:
  61. Annex I General Documents: containing documents at Tabs 1 - 34
    Annex II Maps and Aerial Photographs
    Annex III Exchange of Notes Between the Chairman of the PLO and the Prime Minister of Israel, 9 - 10 September 1993
    Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993
    Annex IV Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 4 May 1994
    Annex V Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 29 August 1994
    Annex VI Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 27 August 1995
    Annex VII Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995
    Annex VIII Note for the Record, 15 January 1997
    Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 17 January 1997
    Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, 21 January 1997
    Annex IX Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998
    Annex X Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September 1999
    Annex XI The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview, July 2000
    Exhibit I Video / CD: Orientation to the Present Conflict

    Note: the translations into English from the original Arabic texts included in this Annex are informal translations by Israel.
    The maps and aerial photographs contained in Annex II are simply larger versions of those contained in the Appendix to the Statement.
     
     

* * *
PART II

BACKGROUND ISSUES:

THE PEACE PROCESS AND EXISTING COMMITMENTS

  1. Although the task of the Committee does not extend to a general review of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, some appreciation of the existing commitments assumed by the Parties in the various agreements concluded between them since 1993 is necessary. At its most basic, the present violence involves a fundamental breach by the Palestinian side of key security commitments assumed pursuant to these agreements. This Part details in chronological form the key elements of those agreements relevant for present purposes.

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    A. Madrid Conference, October 1991

  3. The starting point for this review is the Madrid Conference of October 1991 sponsored jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to launching direct peace talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The purpose of the Conference was to establish a framework for a resumption of the peace process in the Middle East that had seen relatively little movement since the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Following Madrid, direct talks between the parties were started for the first time. These negotiations have so far led to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan on 26 October 1994 and a series of framework and interim agreements between Israel and the Palestinians en route to the jointly declared objective of permanent status negotiations leading to an agreement to end the conflict between them. In the immediate aftermath of Madrid, negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians took the form of negotiations between Israel and a joint Palestinian-Jordan committee. These talks were subsequently overtaken by direct, secret talks held in Norway between Israel and representatives of the PLO upon the initiative of prominent academics on both sides. These talks, and the arrangements that emerged therefrom over time, are now commonly referred to as the Oslo process and the Oslo Agreements. The Camp David negotiations of July 2000 took place within the framework of the permanent status negotiations between the Parties.

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    B. Exchange of Notes Between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, 9 - 10 September 1993

  5. As an important preliminary step in the Oslo Process, an Exchange of Notes took place between Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, on 9 - 10 September 1993. In this historic exchange, the PLO
    • recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security;
    • accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (DOP, Article I);
    • committed itself to the Middle East peace process, "and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations";
    • renounced "the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and ... [assumed] responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators"; and
    • affirmed that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which were inconsistent with the commitments being assumed were from that point inoperative and no longer valid and undertook to secure formal approval for the necessary changes in the Palestinian Covenant.
  6. For its part, Israel confirmed "that in the light of the PLO commitments included in [Chairman Arafat's] letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process".

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    C. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993

  8. Following this Exchange of Notes, the Parties signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("DOP") in Washington on 13 September 1993. In accordance with its terms, the DOP entered into force on 13 October 1993.
  9. The DOP provided for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It was understood that the interim arrangements were to be an integral part of the whole peace process and that negotiations on the permanent status would lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Pursuant to Article V of the DOP, permanent status negotiations were to cover "remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest." (DOP, Article V(3)) Pursuant to Article VII of the DOP, an Interim Agreement was to be negotiated to address arrangements during the interim period.
  10. As regards public order and security, Article VIII of the DOP provided:
  11. "In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank an the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order."
  12. Articles XIII and XIV provided respectively for the redeployment of Israeli forces and for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Annex II to the DOP elaborated on the agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area in inter alia the following terms:
  13. "1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

    2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement." (Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Annex II, DOP)

    D. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 4 May 1994
  14. In implementation of the DOP provisions relating to Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, the two sides signed the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area in Cairo on 4 May 1994 ("Gaza-Jericho Agreement"). This provided for "an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area" in accordance with detailed arrangements set out in Annex I to the Agreement. It also provided for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as the body that would exercise territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction in the areas in question in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Articles II-VII) The Agreement further provided for the establishment by the Palestinian Authority of a Palestinian Directorate of Police Force ("Palestinian Police") and for the establishment of a joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes ("Joint Security Committee" or "JSC"). (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Articles VIII-IX) Detailed provisions concerning the Palestinian Police, including duties and functions, structure and composition, recruitment, arms, ammunition and equipment, foreign assistance and deployment were addressed in Annex I, Article III of the Agreement.
  15. Article IX, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement provided as follows:
  16. "2. Except for the Palestinian Police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area.

    3. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, Article III, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organisation or individual in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I."

  17. Detailed provisions concerning inter alia the arrangements for withdrawal of Israeli military forces, coordination and cooperation in security matters, the Palestinian Police, Security Arrangements in both the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and other matters were addressed in a Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to go into the details of these arrangements as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was superseded, on 28 September 1995, by the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (on which see further below).

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    E. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 29 August 1994

  19. In accordance with the terms of Article VI of the DOP, an Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities was signed by the Parties on 29 August 1994. This provided for the transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority in five areas: education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism and taxation.

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    F. Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 27 August 1995

  21. Following the initial transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority in pursuant to the Agreement of 29 August 1994, a Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities was signed by the Parties on 27 August 1995. This transferred the following additional spheres to the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority: labour, trade and industry, gas and gasoline, insurance, postal services, statistics, agriculture, and local government.

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    G. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995

  23. A major step forward in the peace process was taken with the signing in Washington on 28 September 1995 of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ("the Interim Agreement"). This Agreement and its annexes, running to over 300 pages, marked the conclusion of the first phase of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO and incorporated and superseded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the two agreements concerning the transfer of powers and responsibility noted at sections E and F above. Pending the conclusion of a Permanent Status Agreement as envisaged in the DOP, the Interim Agreement is the principal agreement governing relations between the Parties in respect of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
  24. The Interim Agreement addresses various aspects relating to the transfer of powers and responsibilities from Israel to the Palestinian Council established in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. The Council was inaugurated on 30 January 1996. The Agreement also addresses the redeployment of Israeli military forces from the areas in question and security arrangements in respect of these areas, provisions concerning legal affairs, cooperation in economic and other spheres, and other miscellaneous matters. Detailed provisions concerning redeployment and security arrangements are set out in a Protocol on these matters attached as Annex I to the Agreement.
  25. In accordance with the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Council has both legislative and executive powers. Detailed provisions concerning the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities to the Council are, for example, addressed in a Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex III to the Agreement. In practice, the executive competence of the Council is exercised by the Palestinian Authority which operates as the governmental authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
  26. As regards the redeployment of Israeli military forces and security arrangements, the two sides agreed that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, "except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council". The phasing of the redeployment of Israeli military forces is addressed in detail in the Agreement.

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    (i) Arrangements regarding redeployment in the West Bank

  28. As regards the West Bank, the redeployment of Israeli military forces and the assumption of jurisdiction by the Palestinian Authority has proceeded on the basis of three defined zones. These are evident on Map No.2 appended hereto, West Bank - Major Flashpoints of Conflict. Thus, Area A, marked in brown on Map No.2, describes an area in which the Palestinian Authority has full jurisdiction, including over all matters concerning security, including internal security and public order, although it has no jurisdiction over Israelis. As matters stand today, Area A comprises around 18.1% of the territory of the West Bank and around 59.4% of the Palestinian population, including all the principal Palestinian cities. Israel does not exercise jurisdiction in these areas.
  29. Area B, marked in yellow on Map No.2, describes an area in which the Palestinian Authority has full civil jurisdiction, including responsibility for public order, subject only to overriding Israeli responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. Israel has no military or police presence in these areas. As matters stand today, Area B comprises around 21.7% of the territory of the West Bank and around 39.8% of the Palestinian population, including virtually all populated areas.
  30. Area C, marked in white on Map No.2, comprises the remaining parts of the territory of the West Bank, ie, about 60.2%, and around 0.8% of the Palestinian population. In these areas, the Palestinian Authority has extensive functional jurisdiction over civil matters with the exclusion of matters pertaining to land. Jurisdiction in respect of law and order and security matters remains with Israel. In addition, Israel has jurisdiction over Israeli settlements and military bases.
  31. Since the conclusion of the Interim Agreement, and pursuant to its terms, there has been a steady re-designation of West Bank territory to Areas A and B. As matters stand today, some 39.8% of West Bank territory, encompassing around 99.2% of the Palestinian population, is under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.
  32. The further redeployment of Israeli military forces from and the future status of Area C, in which the Palestinian Authority currently exercises extensive functional jurisdiction, is a key element in the permanent status negotiations.
  33. As will be evident from Map No.2, the principal points of conflict on the West Bank are in areas abutting Areas A or B. In a significant number of cases, live-fire attacks were initiated against Israelis from within Areas A and B.

  34.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (ii) The Gaza Strip

  35. In respect of the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the DOP, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement had provided for an accelerated withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and the transfer of authority in respect of both civil and internal security matters to the Palestinian Authority. Detailed provisions in respect of the withdrawal of Israeli forces were set out in Annex I of that Agreement. The transfer of jurisdiction to the Palestinian Authority was addressed inter alia in Articles III and V, together with Annex I, of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Subject to special arrangements, full civil and security responsibility for the Gaza Strip was transferred to the Palestinian Authority.
  36. Annex I of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement set out in detail agreed arrangements inter alia in respect of security in the Gaza Strip, including the establishment of a Joint Security Committee and various District Coordination Offices ("DCOs") as well as the operation of Joint Patrols and Joint Mobile Units. Pursuant to Article IV of Annex I, arrangements accompanying the withdrawal of Israeli military forces included a number of elements as follows:
    1. the delimitation of a Security Perimeter within the Delimiting Line describing the Gaza Strip in which the Palestinian Police would be responsible for security;
    2. the definition of "Yellow Areas" in which Israel would have the overriding responsibility and powers for security;
    3. provision that Israeli authority would remain in respect of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip;
    4. the definition of various areas in which joint patrols would operate and various other special arrangements would apply;
    5. provisions concerning security in respect of the border with Egypt; and
    6. provisions concerning security on various "Lateral Roads" connecting Israeli settlements with crossing points into Israel.
  37. Key geographic features of the Gaza Strip - including the Delimiting Line, Security Perimeter, Yellow Areas, principal points of habitation and Lateral Roads - as well as major flashpoints of conflict, are indicated on Map No.3 appended hereto, Gaza Strip - Major Flashpoints of Conflict.
  38. The Interim Agreement incorporated and superseded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Reflecting the terms of the earlier Agreement, Article VI of Annex I of the Interim Agreement sets out the agreed security arrangements in respect of the Gaza Strip. These very largely repeat the provisions of the earlier Agreement, including the elements noted in the preceding paragraph. Of particular importance for present purposes, Article VI, paragraph 7(a) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement provides that
  39. "[o]n the three lateral roads connecting the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip to Israel, namely: the Kissufim-Gush Katif road; the Sufa-Gush Katif road; and the Karni-Netzarim road, as indicated by a light blue line on attached map No.2, including the adjacent sides upon which the security of traffic along these roads is dependent (hereinafter 'the Lateral Roads'), the Israeli authorities will have all necessary responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security activity, including Israeli patrols."
  40. Paragraph 9 of Article VI of Annex I provides that Joint Mobile Units will be located inter alia at Netzarim Junction. At this junction,
  41. "the Israeli side of this Joint Mobile Unit will check Israeli vehicles, which will then be able to continue their journey without interference. This Joint Mobile Unit will also operate as a Joint Patrol between the Netzarim junction and the Wadi Gaza under the direction of the relevant DCO."
  42. The Israeli military presence at Netzarim Junction typically numbered around a dozen soldiers.
  43. As will be evident from Map No.3, Netzarim Junction was one of the significant points of conflict in the Gaza Strip. Aerial Photographs No.2A and 2B appended hereto show Netzarim Junction in relation to the Israeli settlement of Netzarim and the Palestinian refugee camps of Nuserat and El Bureij.
  44. As matters stand at present, around 99% of the territory of the Gaza Strip and 100% of its Palestinian population come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority subject only to limited exceptions in respect of the exercise of Israeli security authority. The permanent status of the Gaza Strip, including the Israeli settlements therein, is a key element of the permanent status negotiations.

  45.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iii) Hebron

  46. Annex I, Article VII of the Interim Agreement lays down guidelines for Hebron, including provision for a Temporary International Presence in Hebron ("TIPH"). This provides that both sides are to agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.

  47.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iv) Jewish Holy Sites

  48. Following the redeployment of Israeli forces, several Jewish Holy Sites were left in areas under Palestinian control. The protection of, access to and freedom of worship at these sites is addressed, in common with all other religious sites, by Article 32 of Annex III of the Interim Agreement.
  49. In addition to these general arrangements applicable to all religious sites, Article V of Annex I of the Agreement sets out special security arrangements in respect of two Jewish Holy Sites - Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and the Shalom Al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho - situated in Area A on the West Bank, ie, in areas in which the Palestinian Authority has full jurisdiction, including in respect of security matters. Special arrangements are also agreed in respect of Rachel's Tomb on the outskirts of Bethlehem pursuant to Article V(7) of Annex I.

  50.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (v) Security issues and the Palestinian Police

  51. Article XII of the Interim Agreement provides that in order to guarantee public order and internal security for Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Council shall establish a strong police force. It further provides inter alia that "Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility ... for overall security of Israelis and Settlements".
  52. Article XIV of the Interim Agreement and Article IV of Annex I of that Agreement address various matters concerning the Palestinian Police and access to munitions. Thus, Article XIV(3) and (4) provide:
  53. "3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

    4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organisation, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I."

  54. Article IV of Annex I goes on to address in detail other matters in respect of the Palestinian Police including (a) duties and functions, (b) structure and composition, (c) deployment, (d) recruitment, (e) arms, ammunition and equipment, (f) the introduction of arms, equipment and foreign assistance, and (g) movement. Of particular importance for present purposes is the responsibility of the Palestinian Police to combat terrorism and violence and to prevent incitement to violence.
  55. As regards the size of the Palestinian Police and the extent of its munitions, Article IV(3) of Annex I sets an agreed limit of no more than 30,000 during the interim period. Agreed permitted levels and type of munitions are also set out in detail in this provision.
  56. In respect of security, Article XV(1) of the Interim Agreement provides as follows:
  57. "Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders."
  58. This element is addressed in greater detail in Annex I of the Agreement in terms that are particularly relevant for present purposes. Thus, Article II(1) of Annex I provides that the Palestinian Police is to be the only Palestinian security authority. It goes on to provide:
  59. "b. The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror.

    c. The Council will issue permits in order to legalise the possession and carrying of arms by civilians. Any illegal arms will be confiscated by the Palestinian Police.

    d. The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror."

  60. Paragraphs 2 - 4 of Article II go on to provide as follows:
  61. "2. Both sides will, in accordance with this Agreement, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.

    3. With a view to implementing the above, each side shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, carry out the following functions in the areas under its security responsibility:

    1. protect all residents of, and all other persons present in, these areas;
    2. actively prevent incitement to violence, including violence against the other side or persons under the authority of the other side;
    3. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement; and
    4. prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm to infrastructure serving the other side, including, inter alia, roads, water, electricity, telecommunications and sewage infrastructure.
    4. Both sides undertake to deal with the issue of persons who are present in the areas in violation of this Agreement, and to take further measures in accordance with procedures to be determined by the JSC."
    (vi) Relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority
  62. Under the general heading of "Cooperation", Article XXII of the Interim Agreement addresses relations between Israel and the Palestinian Council (to be read, for these purposes, as including the Palestinian Authority) inter alia in the following terms:
  63. "1. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organisations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

    2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation."

    H. Note for the Record, 15 January 1997
  64. In the context of negotiations concerning redeployment in Hebron, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ra'ees Yasser Arafat met on 15 January 1997 in the presence of the US Special Middle East Coordinator, Ambassador Dennis Ross. At the request of the two leaders, Ambassador Ross prepared a Note for the Record to summarise what they agreed upon at their meeting. This included a reaffirmation of the commitment of both leaders "to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity". Both sides thereafter undertook specific commitments. In this context, the Palestinian side reaffirmed its commitment to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:
  65. "2. Fighting terror and preventing violence
    1. Strengthening security cooperation
    2. Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in Article XXII of the Interim Agreement
    3. Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations and infrastructure
    4. Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists
    5. ...
    6. Confiscation of illegal firearms".
    I. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 17 January 1997
  66. Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement provided for a redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron. In consequence of a series of terrorist attacks in Hebron, the deployment envisaged in the Interim Agreement was delayed. The Parties subsequently concluded a Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on 17 January 1997 to address the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron. The Protocol provided inter alia for the redeployment of Israeli military forces within 10 days of the signing of the Protocol. The Protocol further addressed security powers and responsibilities in Hebron differentiating between Area H-1, in which Palestinian Police were to assume such powers and responsibilities, and Area H-2, in which Israel was to retain security and public order powers. The Protocol further provided for agreed and joint security arrangements.
  67. Paragraph 6 of the Protocol extended the arrangements of the Interim Agreement in respect of Jewish Holy sites to four further sites located in Area H-1 under Palestinian control. Pursuant to this provision, the Palestinian Police assumed responsibility for the protection of the Holy Sites in question.
  68. Paragraph 17 of the Protocol reiterated the terms of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement in providing for a Temporary International Presence in Hebron subject to agreement between the Parties on the modalities of the TIPH.

  69.  

     
     
     
     
     

    J. Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, 21 January 1997

  70. Pursuant to the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, the Parties concluded an Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron on 21 January 1997. This Agreement entered into force on 1 February 1997 and superseded an earlier agreement on the same subject concluded on 9 May 1996. The object of the Agreement was to assist in "creating a feeling of security among Palestinians in the City of Hebron". Pursuant to the Agreement the two sides requested Norway, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey to provide 180 persons as TIPH personnel. The TIPH does not perform military or police functions. Nor may its personnel "interfere in disputes, incidents or the activities of Israeli security forces or the Palestinian Police".

  71.  

     
     
     
     
     

    K. The Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998

  72. In mid-October 1998, President Clinton hosted a Summit meeting of the Parties at Wye River, Maryland. The object of the Summit was to facilitate the implementation of the Interim Agreement and other related agreements concluded by Israel and the Palestinians. This object is stated expressly in the opening paragraph of the Memorandum that emerged from the Summit in the following terms:
  73. "The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of September 28, 1995 (the 'Interim Agreement') and other related agreements including the Note for the Record of January 17, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as 'the prior agreements') so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments and security respectively. These steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with this Memorandum and the attached time lines. They are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not supersede their other requirements."
  74. Section I of the Memorandum addresses further redeployment by the Israeli side. Pursuant to these arrangements, Israel transferred a further 13% of territory from Area C to Areas A and B and 14.2% from Area B to Area A.
  75. Section II of the Memorandum addresses security. Recalling the provisions on security arrangements of the Interim Agreement, this part goes on to state:
  76. "Both sides recognise that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence in accordance with Annex I of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record. They also recognise that the struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure, and the environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure. It must be cooperative in that no effort can be fully effective without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the continuous exchange of information, concepts and actions."
  77. The two following sub-sections dealing with "Security Actions" and "Security Cooperation" are especially important. Under sub-section "A. Security Actions", within a sub-heading on "Outlawing and Combating Terrorist Organisations", it was provided as follows:
  78. "(a) The Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides.

    (b) A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the U.S. and thereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organisations and their infrastructure.

    (c) In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a US-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the US fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organisations (or wings of organisations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them from operating in the areas under its jurisdiction.

    (d) The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror.

    (e) A US-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence and terror."

  79. The Memorandum continues with a section on prohibiting illegal weapons, including an obligation on the Palestinian side to "ensure an effective legal framework is in place to criminalise, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction."
  80. Paragraph 3 of Section II, under the heading "Preventing Incitement", provides:
  81. "(a) Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII(1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.

    (b) A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli, Palestinian and US sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee."

  82. Under sub-section "B. Security Cooperation", provision was made for a trilateral committee to address security matters in the following terms:
  83. "In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organisations. The committee will also serve as a forum to address the issue of external support for terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will fully inform the members of the committee of the results of its investigations concerning terrorist suspects already in custody and the participants will exchange additional relevant information. The committee will report regularly to the leaders of the two sides on the status of cooperation, the results of the meetings and its recommendations."
  84. In Section IV of the Memorandum, the two sides undertook immediately to "resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis and [to] make a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999."
  85. On the same day as the Memorandum was signed, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in respect of several issues of concern raised by Israel relating to security matters. Responding to Israeli concerns over the premature release of terrorist suspects held by the Palestinians - commonly referred to as the "revolving door" policy - the Secretary of State indicated:
  86. "With respect to Palestinian decisions regarding the prosecution, punishment or other legal measures that affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror, there are procedures in place to prevent unwarranted releases. Furthermore, we will express our opposition to any unwarranted releases of such suspects, and in the event of such a release, we will be prepared to express our position publicly."
  87. On 31 October 1998, the US Ambassador to Israel wrote to the Cabinet Secretary of Israel inter alia on the question of prisoner releases in the following terms:
  88. "As for the issue of prisoner releases and the question of a 'revolving door', the statement [made by the US State Department] said: 'we have had discussions with the Palestinians and they have given us a firm commitment that there will be no 'revolving door'.'" L. The Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September 1999
  89. Within the framework of on-going efforts to achieve a Permanent Status Agreement, the two sides met at Sharm El-Sheikh on 4 September 1999 for purposes of resolving outstanding issues relating to the interim status and reaffirming their commitments to the agreements concluded between them since September 1993. The outcome of the Summit was The Sharm-el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations ("Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum") signed by Israel and the PLO on 4 September 1999. The object of the Memorandum is stated in its opening paragraph as follows:
  90. "The Government of the State of Israel ("GOI") and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation ("PLO") commit themselves to full and mutual implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since September 1993 (hereinafter "the prior agreements"), and all outstanding commitments emanating from the prior agreements."
  91. The Memorandum thereafter goes on to provide for an accelerated resumption of Permanent Status negotiations by not later than 13 September 1999 with a determined effort to conclude a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status issues within five months from the resumption of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on Permanent Status issues within one year of the resumption of negotiations.
  92. The Memorandum goes on to address issues concerning redeployment, Israeli release of Palestinian prisoners, the operation of various joint committees, safe passage, the Gaza sea port, issues concerning Hebron and security. In respect of security, paragraph 8(b) of the Memorandum provides:
  93. "Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side undertakes to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, on-going obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the following obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum:
    1. continuation of the program for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports;
    2. apprehension of suspects, including reports;
    3. forwarding of the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli Side not later than September 13, 1999;
    4. beginning of the review of the list by the Monitoring and Steering Committee not later than October 15, 1999."
    M. Conclusions in respect of this part
  94. The Committee is not a tribunal. Its task is not to apportion blame or responsibility. Its role is to report on the facts of the recent events. The object of the exercise in which the Committee is engaged will not therefore, ultimately, be to adjudicate on Israel's claim that the Palestinian side has acted in flagrant disregard, by both act and omission, of its fundamental undertakings and commitments contained in virtually every instrument concluded between the Parties since the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993. This is nonetheless Israel's case. There is a considerable body of evidence to support this position. Within the constraints of this Statement, key elements of that evidence will be touched upon below. Israel considers that the failure by the Palestinian side to fulfil its commitments - in respect of security; the use of illegally held weapons; the active involvement of elements of the Palestinian Police in attacks on Israelis; the incitement to hatred and violence, including by official Palestinian elements; the destruction of Israeli Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control; the release from detention of Palestinian terrorists; as well as other actions - violate the very core of the commitments assumed by the Palestinian side in recent years in the context of the peace process.
  95. At a more general level, Israel's object in setting out the preceding material is fourfold. First, the instruments in question mark a steady movement over recent years by Israel and the Palestinians towards a Permanent Status Agreement designed to bring to an end to the historic conflict between them. This process has not always been smooth and, some may contend, has gone too slowly. It has nevertheless proceeded steadily on the basis of a commonly expressed objective of a Permanent Status Agreement that would address all outstanding issues including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements and borders.
  96. Second, this process towards a Permanent Status Agreement is a process that requires the mutual trust of the participants. The development of trust takes time and good faith in the fulfilment of commitments already assumed. The absence of good faith by the Palestinian side in the fulfilment of its commitments, notably in respect of security, under the various agreements has fundamentally eroded the trust that had been developing between the two sides over the seven years since the Declaration of Principles. The task and challenge of the Committee will be to assist in the rebuilding of that trust.
  97. Third, as the agreements described above attest, Israel's principal concern in the peace process has been security. This issue is of overriding importance. The Israeli population has been subject to attack from the earliest days of the State. Often, notably in the case of terror attacks, such incidents have exhibited a dimension of unrestrained brutality. The lynching of the two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah on 12 October 2000 illustrates this. Security is not something on which Israel will bargain or compromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter and the spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements has long been a source of disturbance in Israel. The events of recent weeks have sharply accentuated these concerns.
  98. Fourth, the provisions in the agreements set out above describe various commitments of the Palestinian side in respect of security. While the task of the Committee is not to adjudicate on claims, the nature and the extent of these commitments will be material for the purposes of assessing how the recurrence of violence may be prevented. Of particular relevance in this context, the commitments of the Palestinian side in respect of security include:
    • a commitment to a peaceful, negotiated process to resolve the conflict between the two sides;
    • the renunciation of terrorism and violence;
    • action by the Palestinian Police to combat terrorism and violence;
    • protection by the Palestinian Police of those falling within the scope of their jurisdiction;
    • the control of illegal weapons;
    • agreed limitations on Palestinian Police numbers and munitions;
    • the active prevention of incitement to violence and hostile propaganda;
    • action to ensure that the Palestinian educational system does not adversely affect the process of reconciliation;
    • the arrest and prosecution of persons suspected of perpetrating acts of violence, terror and incitement;
    • safeguarding of Jewish Holy Sites in areas under Palestinian control;
    • the operation of joint security and other coordinating committees as a means of effective compliance.
* * *
PART III

THE PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE

FAILURE OF CAMP DAVID

  1. In accordance with the commitments undertaken by the two sides in the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum on 4 September 1999, the Parties engaged in negotiations towards the conclusion of a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status ("FAPS") and, in parallel, a Permanent Status Agreement. As expressed in the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, the intention was then to conclude a comprehensive agreement on Permanent Status issues ("CAPS") within one year of the resumption of negotiations. As here conceived, the FAPS and CAPS would together constitute the Permanent Status Agreement. Both sides affirmed their understanding that the negotiations on Permanent Status would lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The negotiations focused inter alia on the key permanent status issues identified in the DOP including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders and security as well as on other elements of interest to both sides.
  2. With a view to facilitating those negotiations, President Clinton invited the two sides to Camp David in July 2000. The Parties convened at Camp David on 11 July. The negotiations broke down on 25 July.
  3. It is not Israel's intention here to go into the details of those negotiations. These are not matters for the public record at this time. Israel very much hopes that something may still be salvaged from those talks. Israel in any event anticipates that Members of the Committee will have been briefed on the essential elements of the negotiations.
  4. What is material for present purposes is the assessment and public perception of the reasons for the failure of the Camp David talks as it is here that the seeds of the present violence are to be found.
  5. Following the break-up of the Camp David negotiations, President Clinton gave a press conference in which he addressed the failure of the negotiations. In material part, his initial statement was as follows:
  6. "After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not be able to reach an agreement at this time. As I explained on the eve of the summit, success was far from guaranteed - given the historical, religious, political and emotional dimensions of the conflict.

    ...

    ... both sides engaged in comprehensive discussions that were really unprecedented because they dealt with the most sensitive issues dividing them; profound and complex questions that long had been considered off limits.

    Under the operating rules that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, they are, of course, not bound by any proposal discussed at the summit. However, while we did not get an agreement here, significant progress was made on the core issues. I want to express my appreciation to Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat and their delegations for the efforts they undertook to reach an agreement.

    Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage [and] vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of peace. The trilateral statement we issued affirms both leaders' commitment to avoid violence or unilateral actions which will make peace more difficult and to keep the peace process going until it reaches a successful conclusion."

  7. The President subsequently responded to questions from the press. These responses are revealing.
  8. "Question: There is a striking contrast between the way you described Prime Minister Barak's courageous and visionary approach to this, and Mr Arafat seemed still to be committed to the path of peace. It sounds like that at the end of the day, Prime Minister Barak was ready to really step up to something that President Arafat wasn't yet ready to step up to.

    The President: Let me be more explicit. I will say again: We made progress on all the core issues. We made really significant progress on many of them. The Palestinian teams worked hard on a lot of these areas. But I think it is fair to say that at this moment in time, maybe because they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because they had thought through it more, that the Prime Minister moved forward more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on - particularly surrounding the questions of Jerusalem.

    ...

    So I said what I said, and my remarks should stand for themselves, because not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat, because this is really hard and never been done before, but in praise of Barak. He came there knowing that he was going to have to take bold steps, and he did it. And I think you should look at it more as a positive toward him than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side.

    ...

    Question: What is your assessment of whether Arafat's going to go through with the threat to declare statehood unilaterally? Did you get any sort of sense on whether he's going to go through with that? Did you have any -

    The President: Well, let me say this. One of the reasons that I wanted to have this summit is that they're both under - will be under conflicting pressures as we go forward. One of the things that often happens in a very difficult peace process is that people, if they're not careful, will gravitate to the intense position rather than the position that will make peace. And it's very often that people know that a superficially safe position is to say no, that you won't get in trouble with whoever is dominating the debate back home wherever your home is, as long as you say no.

    ...

    Question: Are you implying that he should give up his claim to East Jerusalem - the Palestinians should?

    ...

    The President: I didn't say that. ... I said only this: I said - I will say it again - the Palestinians changed their position; [they] moved forward. The Israelis moved more from the position they had. I said what I said; I will say again: I was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak. But I would be making a mistake not to praise Barak because I think he took a big risk. And I think it sparked, already, in Israel a real debate, which is moving Israeli public opinion toward the conditions that will make peace. So I thought that was important, and I think it deserves to be acknowledged.

    ..."

  9. On the same day, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was interviewed on US television. The following is an extract from that interview.
  10. "MS. WARNER: Now, Prime Minister Barak held a press conference today, and he said that - he essentially blamed it on Arafat, and he said that Arafat was unwilling or not able or afraid to take the necessary steps on Jerusalem. Is he right to essentially blame the breakdown on Arafat?

    SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that the way the President put it is that he praised Prime Minister Barak for his boldness and his creativity. Chairman Arafat is dedicated to peace, but I think he comes at it from a different angle. ...

    MS. WARNER: Were the Palestinians willing to move at all on the Jerusalem - their original negotiating position? The President did say - and we are running that tape - that Prime Minister Barak moved more. But did the Palestinians move at all?

    SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that the Palestinians had certain ideas, but I think that one has to honestly say that Prime Minister Barak was the one that had the interesting perceptions and ideas. ..."

  11. The following day, 26 July 2000, US National Security Adviser Samuel Berger was interviewed by Bill Hemmer of CNN:
  12. "Hemmer: It was quite clear from President Clinton, yesterday's briefing in the room where you are standing, reinforced later by Madeleine Albright in an interview, that Yasser Arafat was not willing to deal completely, in full. Why not?

    Berger: Well, first, I would say, both sides did make concessions. I would say that the Israelis were more willing to be creative and flexible. The Palestinians, with respect particularly to the issue of Jerusalem, were not as prepared to compromise, and to give - let go of the - some of their traditional positions, in order for the larger good of creating a Palestinian State and a different future for the Palestinian people.

    ...

    Hemmer: You know the Palestinians have said they want to declare a Palestinian State by the 13th of September. What concerns you more without a peace deal? Is it that deadline looming in September? Or is it potential violence between now and then that may disrupt the entire process?

    Berger: Well, there may be some violence between now and then, but I think that, as we get towards September, the Parties do face a fundamental crossroads. Down one road is confrontation and conflict. Down the other road is an agreement and peace. That involves compromise. And I think, as they stand at those cross roads, I hope that they will assess their positions, I hope [there] will be debates within the Palestinian leadership, just as there were debates in Israel. And I hope that the Parties will be prepared to come back. ..."

* * *
PART IV

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

  1. Writing in the New York Times on 13 October 2000, the distinguished foreign policy commentator Thomas L. Friedman, under the heading "Arafat's War", addressed the violence in the Middle East in the following terms:
  2. "Maybe the most revealing feature of this latest explosion in Israeli-Palestinian violence is the fact that this war has no name. The 'intifada', the Palestinian uprising of the late 1980's, got its name almost immediately. Intifada loosely means 'shaking off', and Palestinians were said to be trying to shake off the Israeli occupation. The name made so much sense that even Israelis used it. But the violence of the last two weeks still has no name. And that is not an accident. It's because even the participants can't explain what it's about, or, deep down, they're embarrassed to do so.

    Here's why: the roots of this latest violent outburst can be traced directly back to President Clinton's press conference after the breakdown of the Camp David Summit. At that time, Mr Clinton pointedly, deliberately - and rightly - stated that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had offered unprecedented compromises at the Summit - more than 90 percent of the West Bank for a Palestinian State, a partial resolution of the Palestinian Refugee problem and Palestinian Sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem - and that Yasir Arafat had not responded in kind, or at all.

    Palestinians were shocked by Mr Clinton's assessment. For the first time in a long time, Mr Arafat no longer had the moral high ground. He, and the Arab leaders, had grown so comfortable with Bibi Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel - a man the world always blamed for any peace breakdown - that they were stunned and unprepared for the seriousness of Mr Barak's offer and the bluntness of Mr Clinton's assessment. Other world leaders told Mr Arafat the same thing: Barak deserves a serious counteroffer.

    Mr Arafat had a dilemma: make some compromises, build on Mr Barak's opening bid and try to get it closer to 100 percent - and regain the moral high ground that way - or provoke the Israelis into brutalising Palestinians again, and regain the moral high ground that way. Mr Arafat chose the latter. So instead of responding to Mr Barak's peacemaking overture, he and his boys responded to Ariel Sharon's peace-destroying provocation. In short, the Palestinians could not deal with Barak, so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did.

    Of course, the Palestinians couldn't explain it in those terms, so instead they unfurled all the old complaints about the brutality of the continued Israeli occupation and settlement-building. Frankly, the Israeli checkpoints and continued settlement-building are oppressive. But what the Palestinians and Arabs refuse to acknowledge is that today's Israeli Prime Minister was offering them a dignified exit. It was far from perfect for Palestinians, but it was a proposal that, with the right approach, could have been built upon and widened. Imagine if when Mr Sharon visited the Temple Mount, Mr Arafat had ordered his people to welcome him with open arms and say 'when this area is under Palestinian sovereignty, every Jew will be welcome, even you, Mr Sharon.' Imagine the impact that would have had on Israelis.

    But that would have been an act of statesmanship and real peaceful intentions, and Mr Arafat, it's now clear, possesses neither. He prefers to play the victim rather than the statesman. This explosion of violence would be totally understandable if the Palestinians had no alternative. But that was not the case. What's new here is not the violence, but the context. It came in the context of a serious Israeli peace overture, which Mr Arafat has chosen to spurn. That's why this is Arafat's war. That's its real name."

  3. It will come as no surprise to the Committee to learn that Israel does not agree with all aspects of this analysis. In particular, Mr Friedman's observations concerning the "oppressive nature" of Israeli checkpoints leaves out of account the threat that they are designed to contain. The issue of Israeli settlements is one of the key elements in the permanent status negotiations. In respect of Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, it should be recalled that this is the holiest site in Judaism. Mr Friedman's analysis is, however, accurate in a fundamental respect. The Palestinian resort to violence from late September 2000 was in significant measure the result of an orchestrated campaign by the Palestinian leadership. As Mr Friedman observed, the immediate objective of this action was to neutralise and counteract the widely held appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the failure of the Camp David negotiations and the virtually uniform international reaction in the run-up to Mr Arafat's 13 September 2000 deadline for the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state counselling against such a step. More widely, the violence has been part of a nurtured policy of the Palestinian leadership pursued with the deliberate intention of provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative. It also served to alleviate both internal and wider Arab pressures on the Palestinian leadership and re-enlist the support of the Arab world in the Palestinian dispute with Israel.
  4. Israel does not, by this, for a moment, mean to suggest that there is no wider context for the present events. The present violence is part of the wider Palestinian - Israeli conflict. It is, however, too simplistic to lay the violence of the past 93 days at the doorstep of that conflict in general terms. Although there have been incidents of violence in the period since the start of the Oslo process, progress towards a Permanent Status Agreement has proceeded in the absence of violence on the scale of that witnessed in recent weeks. The question, therefore, is what happened in the period prior to late September 2000 which acted as a catalyst for the recent events.
  5. The significant developments in this period were the Camp David negotiations of July 2000, the widespread appreciation in the international community that their failure was due to inflexibility on the Palestinian side and the advice broadly tendered to Mr Arafat that he should not proceed to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood on 13 September 2000. These were the immediate and principal catalytic events leading to the violence. Underlying this was a longer-term policy of the Palestinian leadership which effectively laid the groundwork for a campaign of violence to further the goal of the unilateral establishment of a Palestinian State.
  6. A number of elements in respect of this appreciation call for further preliminary comment. First, contrary to the publicly expressed views of the Palestinian side that the cause of the violence was a spontaneous and popular reaction to the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000, this was not the case. While the Sharon visit may have been an excuse for the violence, it was not the cause. As has already been suggested, the cause is deeper-rooted and predates Mr Sharon's visit by some time.
  7. Second, as the preceding appreciation of the immediate causes of the events of recent weeks makes clear, the violence was instigated and coordinated; it was not spontaneous. It was also fanned, both in the period leading up to the commencement of the violence and during the course of the conflict, by incitement to violence and hostile propaganda which ran deep in the structures of the Palestinian community - public and vociferous intonations to kill Jews and Israelis proclaimed by Imams at Friday prayers, incendiary descriptions of Israel and Jews in books introduced into the curriculum at Palestinian schools, including those for young children, calls for a religious conflict against Israel in the period following the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations, as well as other elements.
  8. Third, not only was the violence nurtured, planned and prosecuted as an instrument of policy by the Palestinian leadership but key elements of the Palestinian security apparatus have actively participated in the violence. The violence, notably in its live-fire dimensions, thus has had all the characteristics of an armed conflict - live-fire attacks on a significant scale, both quantitatively and geographically; by a well armed and organised militia; under the command of a political establishment; operating from areas outside Israeli control; pursuing political aims.
  9. Fourth, at its most basic level, the very fact of the violence attests to the failure on the part of the PLO and Palestinian Authority to take the steps that they committed themselves to in the agreements with Israel to forestall violence and terror. Far from acting to prevent violence, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Police have actively supported and directed the violence.
  10. These and other issues relevant to an analysis of the immediate causes of the violence will now be addressed in more detail.

  11.  

     
     
     
     
     

    A. Laying the groundwork for violence

  12. The immediate catalyst for the violence of late September 2000 was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on 25 July 2000 and the widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse. The violence was part of a planned campaign by the Palestinian leadership to recapture the diplomatic initiative. As Abu-Ali Mustafa, a member of the Palestinian Authority, stated on 23 July 2000, even before the final breakdown of the Camp David negotiations:
  13. "The issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and sovereignty are one and will be finalised on the ground and not in negotiations. At this point it is important to prepare Palestinian society for the challenge of the next step because we will inevitably find ourselves in a violent confrontation with Israel in order to create new facts on the ground. ... I believe that the situation in the future will be more violent than the Intifada."
  14. As this statement indicates, there was, within senior figures in the Palestinian leadership, a clear view, even in the very midst of the Camp David negotiations, that a violent confrontation with Israel was necessary "in order to create new facts on the ground". Violence was part of the agenda - notwithstanding all the commitments to the contrary in the agreements concluded since September 1993. The Palestinian dilemma, even prior to Camp David, was whether to engage with Israel in a serious attempt to address the issues that divided the two sides or to pursue a strategy which would lay the groundwork for a violent confrontation aimed at creating "new facts on the ground".
  15. In reality, both options were pursued. The permanent status negotiations continued, crystallising in July 2000 in the Camp David Summit. At the same time, the groundwork was laid for a violent confrontation. This took various forms: an increase in hostile propaganda, the military training of Palestinian children at so-called "summer camps", the failure to confiscate illegal weapons, the growth in the numbers of the Palestinian Police beyond agreed levels, the unwarranted release of terrorist detainees held in Palestinian prisons (the so-called "revolving door" policy), and preparations at a civilian level in prospect of a conflict. These elements assumed particular significance in the period following the Camp David Summit, the failure of the negotiations being the catalyst leading to a refocusing of the balance between these tracks in favour of confrontation. Within the limits of this initial Statement, key aspects of each of these elements are addressed in more detail below.

  16.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (i) Hostile propaganda and incitement to violence

  17. Article XXII(1) of the Interim Agreement provides that the Parties "shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda". Paragraph (2) of the same Article addresses hostile propaganda in the educational system, providing expressly that the Parties "will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation". These provisions are echoed explicitly in paragraph 2(b) of the Note for the Record of 15 January 1997 and in section II, paragraph 3 of the Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998. The obligations to take measures to preclude hostile propaganda and to refrain from incitement stand at the very core of the peace process.
  18. Notwithstanding these commitments, hostile propaganda directed against Jews and Israelis, officially sanctioned, and of the most insidious kind, is all too evident. This is particularly so in the case of children. A frequently cited example is that of a Palestinian children's television programme called the "Children's Club" which, through a "Sesame Street" formula involving interaction between children, puppets and fictional characters, encourages a hatred for Jews and the perpetration of violence against them in a "jihad" or "holy war".
  19. In one song, for example, very young children are shown singing about wanting to become "suicide warriors" taking up machine guns against Israelis. Another song features young children singing a refrain "when I wander into Jerusalem, I will become a suicide bomber". "We will settle our claims with stones and bullets" and "jihad against Israel" are amongst other common proclamations of the child participants.
  20. The same message emerges from school books used in Palestinian classrooms in the current academic year (2000 - 2001), many of which were prepared by the Palestinian Ministry of Education. Thus, for example, a textbook entitled Muqarar al-Tilawa Wa'ahkam Al-Tajwid prepared for 5th graders, describes Jews as cowards for whom Allah has prepared fires of hell. In a text for 8th graders, Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus al-Adabia, Israelis are referred to as the butchers in Jerusalem. Stories glorifying those who throw stones at soldiers are found in various texts. A 9th grade text, Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus al-Adabia, refers to the bacteria of Zionism that has to be uprooted out of the Arab nation. The list is long and goes on in similar vein.
  21. In the period since the start of the conflict in late September 2000, the incitement to violence against Jews and Israelis has become more direct and vociferous. This aspect is addressed below in the review of the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in the course of the current violence. For present purposes, it suffices simply to note the incidence of serious violations by the Palestinian side of the prohibition of hostile propaganda and incitement contained in the Interim Agreement, the Note for the Record and the Wye River Memorandum. Israel is prepared to expand upon this element in greater detail in future submissions to the Committee.

  22.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (ii) The military training of Palestinian children

  23. There is growing international concern about the involvement of children in armed conflict. The conscription of children into armed militia has been addressed by the international community in the context of various conflicts. These issues are addressed in a range of treaties and other international instruments.
  24. In stark contrast to these accepted norms, the Palestinian leadership has actively developed a policy of military training for children. This practice was described in a report on 25 October 2000 in The Times of London by Sam Kiley, the newspaper's Middle East Bureau Chief, inter alia in the following terms:
  25. "Stone-throwing children at the centre of riots on the West Bank and Gaza have received weeks of training in guerrilla warfare, including mock kidnappings, from Yassir Arafat's Fatah movement.

    The children, some as young as 11, took a break yesterday from an often deadly game of cat and mouse with heavily armed Israeli soldiers to boast of their exploits in training camps where they were also indoctrinated with ferocious anti-Israeli sentiments.

    Over the past four weeks at least 120 Palestinians have been killed by Israelis. About a third of them were boys as young as 12, some among the 25,000 youngsters trained in 90 different Fatah camps earlier this year."

  26. This reference to the so-called "summer camps" is accurate. During the summer of 2000, some 27,000 Palestinian children between the ages of 7 - 18 took part in such camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These camps were funded by the Palestinian Authority. The largest of the camps were under the direction of Fatah, the principal military-political grouping of the PLO of which Yasser Arafat is the head. A common theme was preparation for armed conflict. Amongst other activities, the children were trained in the operation of firearms.
  27. The summer camps are part of a wider practice which has seen children under the age of 18 "conscripted" into the Fatah militia - known as the Tanzim - as well as into special Fatah Youth cadres - known as the Shabibah. In this role, many of these children carry weapons and are trained in their use. As clip number 4 on the orientation video attached as Exhibit I shows, "slitting the throats of Israelis" is one of the children's exercises at these camps.
  28. Israel has detailed evidence in support of this claim. It is prepared to develop this material fully in later submissions to the Committee.

  29.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iii) The failure to confiscate illegal weapons

  30. Reflecting provisions in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 1994, Article XIV(4) of the Interim Agreement provides that
  31. "[e]xcept for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and those of Israeli military forces, no organisation, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I."
  32. Article IV(5) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement goes on to specify precisely and in detail the numbers and types of weapons that were permitted to the Palestinian Police. These include a quantity of rifles, pistols and other light personal weapons and 240 "machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5" caliber". Pursuant to Article IV(5)(e) of Annex I, the Palestinian Police were required to "maintain an updated register of all weapons held by its personnel."
  33. Pursuant to Article XI(2) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, each side was required to enforce
  34. "in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with their security responsibility, a prohibition on possession or carrying of weapons without a licence."
  35. The Article goes on to set out provisions in respect of the licensing of weapons, the requirement to maintain a register of licensed weapons and the requirement to prevent the manufacture of weapons and the transfer of weapons to persons not licensed to possess them.
  36. Article II(1) of Annex I, under the heading "Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence", provides in paragraph (c) that the Palestinian Council
  37. "will issue permits in order to legalise the possession and carrying of arms by civilians. Any illegal arms will be confiscated by the Palestinian Police."
  38. These provisions in respect of weapons are an integral and essential part of the security commitments which are fundamental to the Interim Agreement. They involve a commitment in respect of (a) the numbers and types of weaponry available to the Palestinian Police as the agreed, and only, Palestinian security authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, (b) the restricted licensing of weapons, on the basis of agreed principles, to be held by civilians, and (c) the confiscation by the Palestinian Police of all illegal weapons.
  39. Palestinian non-compliance with these provisions has been a source of significant Israeli disquiet from the outset. The Palestinian commitment in respect of illegal weaponry was thus expressly revisited in the Note for the Record of 15 January 1997 in which the Palestinian side explicitly reaffirmed its commitment in respect of the "confiscation of illegal firearms".
  40. In the light of continuing Israeli disquiet over Palestinian non-compliance with these provisions, the matter was raised again in the context of the Wye River Summit in October 1998. The issue was addressed in the Memorandum that emerged from that meeting in the following terms:
  41. "II. SECURITY

    A. Security Actions

    ...

    2. Prohibiting Illegal Weapons

    (a) The Palestinian side will ensure an effective legal framework is in place to criminalise, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

    (b) In addition, the Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and continuously implement a systematic program for the collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The US has agreed to assist in carrying out this program.

    (c) A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will be established to assist and enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorised introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdiction."

  42. In the wake of continued Palestinian non-compliance with these provisions, the matter was revisited once again at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit in September 1999. As provided in the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum:
  43. "Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side undertakes to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, on-going obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the following obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum:

    1) continuation of the program for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports ..."

  44. Notwithstanding these provisions, there is clear evidence of continuing violations of these commitments by the Palestinian side from the outset of the Oslo process. This includes violations in respect of both the quantity and the type of weaponry available to the Palestinian Police, the unlicensed possession of weapons by the Tanzim and other militia as well as by the civilian population, and the failure on the part of the Palestinian police to confiscate illegal weapons. In addition to excessive numbers of permitted weapons - such as pistols, assault rifles and sub-machine guns - in the hands of the Palestinian Police, illegal weapons held by the Police, militia and other groups and individuals include the following:
    • machine guns,
    • hand grenades,
    • rocket propelled grenades,
    • grenade launchers,
    • anti-tank missiles,
    • shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles, cannons and machine guns,
    • mortars,
    • mines, and
    • high explosives.
  45. Israel is prepared to adduce further evidence in support of these claims in subsequent submissions to the Committee.
  46. As will by now be well known, one of the significant features of the violence of the past 93 days has been the live-fire attacks by the Palestinian side against Israelis. In many cases, Palestinian Police have participated actively in these attacks. In overwhelming measure, the weapons used by the Palestinians in these attacks have been illegal weapons, illegally held. This element is addressed further below in the context of the review of the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in the course of the conflict. The stockpiling of illegal weapons and the systematic failure on the part of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Police to fulfil their obligations to confiscate these weapons has been a fundamental element in the groundwork for the present violence.

  47.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iv) The growth in the numbers of the Palestinian Police beyond agreed levels

  48. Article IV(3) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement provides that
  49. "[d]uring the interim period, the total number of policemen of the Palestinian Police in all its branches in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be no more than 30,000 out of which up to 12,000 policemen may be deployed in the West Bank and up to 18,000 policeman in the Gaza Strip."
  50. This provision, as with others concerning security, was, from Israel's perspective, a fundamental element of the peace accords. The risk attendant upon Israeli acceptance of what for all practical purposes is a Palestinian army was spelt out starkly by Nabil Sha'ath, a senior member of the Palestinian leadership in a speech in Nablus in 1996, in the following terms:
  51. "We decided to liberate our homeland step-by-step ... Should Israel continue - no problem. And so, we honour the peace treaties and non-violence ... if and when Israel says 'enough' ... in that case it is saying that we will return to violence. But this time it will be with 30,000 armed Palestinian soldiers and in a land with elements of freedom ... If we reach a dead end we will go back to our war and struggle like we did forty years ago."
  52. This Palestinian "army" is organised into 12 branches operating in three areas - a military component, a civilian law enforcement component and an intelligence and prevention component. Notwithstanding the provision in Article XIV(3) of the Interim Agreement that the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces were to be the only armed forces operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a further significant and heavily armed military force, the Tanzim, or Fatah militia, operates in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the direct control of Yasser Arafat. The Tanzim is charged with the daily management of Fatah's activities in the field of "security", including the acquisition of illegal weapons. It has been the armed actions of the Tanzim that has enabled the Palestinian leadership to turn the present crisis into a confrontation on the scale of an armed conflict. Tanzim forces are charged with marshalling people for action, organising that action and distributing weapons such as molotov cocktails. They also provide the principal live-fire dimension to the Palestinian attacks.
  53. Not counting the Tanzim and other militia forces, the numbers of Palestinian Police in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip exceed the agreed permitted levels by around 10,000 policemen. In the light of Israeli concern at the growth in this force and the potential threat posed thereby, the issue was the subject of review at the Wye River Summit at which time the Palestinian side agreed to "provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements." The issue was revisited again in the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum.
  54. In purported compliance with these commitments, the Palestinian Authority, in March 2000, provided Israel with a list of policemen. Notwithstanding the agreed limit of 30,000 in the Interim Agreement, this named 39,899 policemen.
  55. In the light of the active involvement of elements within the Palestinian Police in live-fire attacks against Israelis over the course of the past 93 days, Israel cannot emphasise strongly enough its disquiet at this violation of the Interim Agreement in respect of this matter. Police numbers constitute an essential component of the security arrangements that are fundamental to the agreements concluded between Israel and the PLO. The growth in the numbers of Palestinian Police in violation of the Interim Agreement is a further element in the groundwork for violence.

  56.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (v) The unwarranted release of terrorist detainees held in Palestinian prisons

  57. Article II(1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement provides inter alia that "[t]he Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror." Paragraph 3(c) of the same Article reaffirms this commitment, providing that one of the functions and responsibilities in respect of the prevention of terrorism and violence is to "apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement". Article II of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement sets out various provisions regarding cooperation in criminal matters, including the extradition of suspects and defendants.
  58. Effective action by the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Police against those suspected or found guilty of complicity in acts of violence and terror is an essential component of the security commitments assumed by the Palestinian side under the agreements with Israel. Israeli concern that the Palestinian side was pursuing a "revolving door" policy with regard to such persons - the unwarranted release of such persons following detention - was the subject of review at the Wye River Summit in October 1998 at which point the Palestinian side expressly undertook that it would
  59. "apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror."
  60. Affirming the importance of this matter, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the same date inter alia in the following terms:
  61. "... we wanted to confirm our understanding of assurances we have received from the Palestinians on several issues that you have indicated are of special concern to Israel. Regarding the Palestinian apprehension of terrorism suspects (II(A)(1)(d)), we have been assured that all the cases which have been identified will be acted upon. With respect to Palestinian decisions regarding the prosecution, punishment or other legal measures that affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror, there are procedures in place to prevent unwarranted releases. Furthermore, we will express our opposition to any unwarranted releases of such suspects, and in the event of such a release, we will be prepared to express our position publicly."
  62. Israeli concerns about Palestinian non-compliance with these commitments was revisited at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit in September 1999 at which time the Palestinian side again undertook inter alia to implement its obligations in respect of the "apprehension of suspects, including reports".
  63. The Palestinian side remains in violation of these commitments. The unwarranted release of persons suspected or found guilty of complicity in acts of violence and terror increased significantly in the period following the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on 25 July 2000 and, to the point of the start of the violence in late September 2000, included the release of over 50 members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") who had been involved in attacks against Israel and Israelis. In very many cases, those released have played an active role in the violence. Key figures who have been complicit in acts of violence and terror against Israelis released by the Palestinian Authority in the period July - September 2000 include:
  64. Adnan Muhammad Jaber Ghol Hamas
    'Ahd Yusuf Musa Ulmeh PFLP
    Ahmed Fathi Ahmed Mahadawi Islamic Jihad
    Alaa' Awad Ahmed Shuli Hamas
    Ahmed Said Halil Ja'bari Hamas
    'Amar Dib Ahmed Surur Hamas
    Ashraf Muhammad Sh'hade Zakat Hamas
    Awad Salah id Silmi Hamas
    Ayub Ahmed Ayub 'Atallah Hamas
    Halid Hasan Ahmad Jumaa' Hamas
    Halil Muhammad Halil Jalidan Hamas
    Hashim 'Ashur Al-Malk Salim-Dib Islamic Jihad
    Ibrahim Muhammad Suliman Abu-Alwan Hamas
    Imad Shaaban Muhammad Sharif Hamas
    Lu'i Shafiq Dib Sawalha Hamas
    Muhammad Hasain Sa'id 'Sulayman Keshef Hamas
    Muhammad Ibrahim Hasan Sanwar Hamas
    Muhammad Musa Hasan Jadallah Hamas
    Muhammad Saqr Rajib Zatma Islamic Jihad
    Nabil Hasan Salem Sharihi Islamic Jihad
    Nasir Subhi Amhed 'Atar Hamas
    Ra'ad Sa'id Hasin Sa'ad Hamas
    Rabah Darwish Husayn Zakut Hamas
    Ra'fat Ramadan Salim Ubeid Hamas
    Riad Salah 'Ali Abu-Hashish Islamic Jihad
    Suhil Nam'an Salah Abu-Nahil Hamas
  65. The unwarranted release of such detainees sends a message to the Palestinian community that terrorism is acceptable. More than that, it releases into the community individuals who are committed to pursuing such a course of action and who have the experience and capability to do so. The release of these detainees involves a fundamental breach by the Palestinian Authority of its commitments under the various agreements concluded with Israel.

  66.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (vi) Preparations at a civilian level in prospect of a conflict

  67. The planned nature of the present violence is also illustrated by initiatives taken by the Palestinian leadership in civil matters in preparation for violence. Thus, for example, as reported in the leading Arabic daily newspaper Al Quds on 20 July 2000, Nagaa Abu-Bakr, the head of the Palestinian Supply Management Office in Nablus, met with local merchants on 19 July 2000, in the midst of the Camp David negotiations, and requested them to take such steps as may be necessary in the area of food supplies to ensure that there would not be a shortage in the event of a confrontation following the failure of the negotiations.
  68. The same picture emerges from activity in other sectors. For example, as reported in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, an official newspaper of the Palestinian Authority, on 12 July 2000, the Palestinian Health Minister Riad Elzaanun indicated that his office was checking the strategic supplies of medicines and medical equipment in case of emergency as part of the preparations for the forthcoming declaration of Palestinian statehood. Other examples of similar initiatives are also evident.
  69. The picture that emerges from these initiatives is of a Palestinian leadership acting in preparation for a violent confrontation. These actions comprehensively debunk the notion that the violence of late September was a spontaneous event in response to the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount.

  70.  

     
     
     
     
     

    B. The failure of the Camp David Summit and preparations for conflict

  71. By the time of the start of the Camp David Summit on 11 July 2000, the groundwork for violence had been laid. Preparations for conflict gathered pace after the breakdown of the negotiations on 25 July 2000. It was clear from this point that the balance, insofar as the Palestinian leadership was concerned, had shifted in favour of confrontation.
  72. This re-balancing of the strategic focus of the Palestinian leadership following - and even in the midst of - the Camp David negotiations, is clear from the public statements of members of the Palestinian Authority. The following chronological sequence of statements illustrates the proposition:
    1. as reported in Kul Al-Arab on 14 July 2000 (ie, three days after the start of the Camp David Summit), a "senior security figure" in the Palestinian Authority was quoted as saying:
    2. "The Palestinian people are in a state of emergency against the failure of the Camp David summit. If the situation explodes, the Palestinian people living in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority are ready for the next fierce battle against the Israeli occupation. ... The next Intifada will be more violent than the first one especially since the Palestinian people now possess weapons allowing them to defend themselves in a confrontation with the Israeli army. ... the Lebanese experience of wiping out the Israeli occupation from southern Lebanon gave the Palestinian people the needed moral strength and added to their spirit of armed struggle."
    3. as reported by Reuters on 20 July 2000, Abdel-Razek Al-Mujaydeh, the head of the Palestinian National Security Forces in the Gaza Strip, stated:
    4. "If [Camp David] reaches deadlock or failure there will be disappointment among Palestinians which could be accompanied by violence."
    5. as reported by Reuters on 9 August 2000, Abu Ala (also known as Ahmed Korei), the Speaker of the Palestinian Council and a senior Palestinian negotiator at Camp David, stated:
    6. "When we are convinced a peace agreement with Israel is not possible, no doubt our people and the leadership of the Palestinian people will have other alternatives. ... I am not calling for violence, but I don't know how the people will react."
    7. as reported by the Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida on 16 August 2000, Muhammad Dahlan, the head of the Preventive Security component of the Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip, stated:
    8. "In the event that no agreement is reached with the occupier and a confrontation takes place, both sides will suffer. 'Whoever thinks that confronting us will be easy must understand that today our people has greater capability than when the PLO were in Beirut ... we are in a phase in which we are close to an independent sovereign state, maybe we will reach it through blood, but in any case we are not willing to accept anything less than a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.'"
    9. as reported in the Arabic newspaper Al-Ayam on 14 September 2000, Muhammad Dahlan again stated:
    10. "The Palestinian people know how to react to an Israeli attack and they are not incapable of doing this. They have experience in defending themselves, their honour and the honour of the Arab nation. ... We do not have unlimited time and there is a limit to these negotiations."
    11. as reported on the Voice of Palestine radio on 19 September 2000, Yasser Abed Rabo, the Minister for Information and one of the principal Palestinian negotiators, stated:
    12. "We feel that the Israelis harden their positions every day, and that their positions are fickle. ... These positions and ideas are of a provocative character, and will lead to nothing but a confrontation on a religious ground."
  73. Eight days later, on 27 September 2000, the violence began with a roadside bomb attack against Israelis at Netzarim Junction in the Gaza Strip.
  74. The orchestrated dimension of the violence in pursuit of wider political objectives is evident even more clearly from statements made following the outbreak of the conflict. A number of examples will suffice to illustrate the point:
    1. On 4 October 2000, a Belgian television team from RTL-TV1 was filming in the area of Ramallah. The following report was subsequently filed by Jean Pierre Martin of this team on 5 October 2000:
    2. "We were filming the beginning of the demonstration. Suddenly, a van pulled in hurriedly. Inside, there were Fatah militants. They gave their orders and even distributed Molotov cocktails. We were filming. But these images, you will never see. In a few seconds, all those youngsters surrounded us, threatened us, and then took us away to the police station. There, we identified ourselves but we were compelled to delete the controversial pictures. The Palestinian Police calmed the situation but censored our pictures. We now have the proof that those riots are no longer spontaneous. All the orders came from the Palestinian hierarchy."
    3. On 6 October 2000, a few days after the violence began, Fatah published a declaration - one of many produced during the conflict - in Nablus. This stated inter alia as follows:
    4. "The Nablus district of the Fatah movement calls for the following:
      1. To regard Friday October 6th as a day of rage and to expand it to all the country.
      2. To proceed with the Intifada! The fighting guns will sow and the politics will reap. Our right to struggle is legitimate and a national necessity without controversy.
      3. To expand the circle of clashes and confrontation to the entire district: the city of Nablus, the refugee camps and the countryside. The wider the circle of clashes, so will the inevitable results be in our favour.
      4. It is important that there will be coordination between the different bodies in the movement, between the district and the sub-district leaderships.
      5. To search for geographical posts in our countryside because of their important role in striking settler movements and concentrations.
      6. To avoid unorganised activities and to rely on pre-studied 'quality' actions. We must differentiate the wide work of the masses from the quality work of small groups so as to inflict as many casualties as possible in the lines of Israelis in general and settlers in particular.
      7. To avoid any shooting that is not directed at Israeli targets or isn't executed in the right way.
      8. To have complete faith in the political leadership and in the movement's leadership, in the head of both stands president Abu-Amar [Yasser Arafat] ..."
    5. On 5 December 2000, the Palestinian Minister of Communications, Imad Al-Falouji, addressed a symposium of the Journalists Association of Gaza. His remarks were reported in the Arabic daily newspaper Al-Ayam on 6 December 2000. Referring to the conflict, Mr Al-Falouji is reported as having stated that the Palestinian Authority began its preparations for the outbreak of the current Intifada from the moment of return from the Camp David negotiations. According to Mr Al-Falouji, Yasser Arafat anticipated the eruption of the Intifada as a consolidation of the firm Palestinian stand in negotiations with Israel and not simply as a protest against Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. The preparations for the Intifada began in accordance with Arafat's request.
    6. On 7 December 2000, the Arabic daily newspaper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida carried an interview with Sakher Habash, a member of the Fatah Central Committee and an influential figure in the Palestinian leadership. He described the preparations for the confrontation with Israel in the following terms:
    7. "From the information received and from an analysis of the political perceptions after Camp David, it became clear to Fatah, also on the basis of Yasser Arafat's statements, that the next stage necessitated preparations for confrontation. This is because Prime Minister Ehud Barak is not a partner that can respond to the aspirations of our people. Based on this assessment, Fatah prepared more than all other national movements for this confrontation. In order for it to play the role that it assumed, it coordinated all its tanzim mechanisms and its civilian and ruling apparatus. Fatah was not surprised by the outbreak of the Intifada. Fatah did not see the general struggle in the permanent status agreement stage as a way to improve our situation in the negotiations and not just a reaction to Sharon's provocative visit of the Temple Mount, although this was the spark. The Intifada was the result of a built-up rage among our people that was ripe for an explosion before the Barak government, for the sake of an important matter that has been postponed for more than a year and a half - the matter of independence."
  75. As these extracts make clear, the violence was not spontaneous. It was a planned and orchestrated campaign by the Palestinian leadership. Detailed elements of this planning were coordinated by local Fatah committees and the Tanzim as well as by elements within the Palestinian security apparatus.

  76.  

     
     
     
     
     

    C. The visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, 28 September 2000

  77. As the preceding review makes clear, the groundwork for violence had been laid by the Palestinian leadership well before the visit by Opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on Thursday, 28 September 2000. The visit was not the cause of the violence. As there has been a good deal of dissembling associated with the visit of Mr Sharon to the Temple Mount, it may be helpful to the Committee if key aspects of this event are described more fully.
  78. Mr Sharon, the leader of the Opposition in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, published his intention to visit the Temple Mount on 24 September 2000, four days prior to the intended visit. The declared purpose of the visit was to examine archaeological sites on the Temple Mount following work that had been carried out by the Muslim Wakf, notably in the area of Solomon's Stables. The location of this area within the Temple Mount compound is indicated on Aerial Photograph No.1 appended hereto, which, together with other geographic points, also shows the route taken by Mr Sharon on his visit to the area. At the time of announcing his intention to visit the area, Mr Sharon indicated that he would be accompanied by archaeologists from the Israeli Antiquities Authority.
  79. In the context of this visit, it should be recalled that the Temple Mount is the holiest site in Judaism. It has been a sanctified place for Jews for over 3,000 years. Known also by the name Mount Moriah, it is the place at which Abraham was called upon to sacrifice his son Isaac. It is mentioned on hundreds of occasions in the Old Testament. As its name suggests, it is the site of the ancient Temple built by King Solomon. Whole chapters of the Old Testament, in Kings I, deal with the construction of the Temple. Following the destruction of the first Temple by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzer, a second Temple was built on the same site. This stood until it too was destroyed 600 years later, this time by Roman legions under Titus.
  80. Two biblical references to the Temple Mount will suffice to illustrate its holiness and centrality to Judaism. The first is the evocative passage from Isaiah 2:1 - 4, a vision to the future, with which this Statement opened:
  81. The word that Isaiah the son of Amoz saw concerning
       Judah and Jerusalem,
    That the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established
       as the top of the mountains,
    And shall be exalted above the hills;
    And all nations shall flow unto it.
    And many peoples shall go and say:
    Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord,
    To the house of the God of Jacob;
    And He will teach us of His ways;
    And we will walk in His paths.
    For out of Zion shall go forth the law,
    And the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
    And He shall judge between the nations,
    And shall decide for many peoples;
    And they shall beat their swords into plowshares,
    And their spears into pruning-hooks;
    Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
    Neither shall they learn war any more.
  82. The second, from Haggai 2:9, refers to the time of the second Temple:
  83. The glory of this latter house shall be greater than that of the former, saith the Lord of hosts;
    and in this place will I give peace, saith the Lord of hosts.
  84. The Western Wall, the last remnant of the second Temple, is at the foot of the Temple Mount and is the holiest remaining site for Jewish prayer and pilgrimage today. In their daily prayers over millenia Jews have evoked the holiness of the site, praying for the rebuilding of the Temple. Even the word "Zionism", which is the spiritual source of the modern State of Israel, is a reckoning back to the holiness of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount.
  85. The sensitivity of and risks associated with the proposed visit by Mr Sharon to the Temple Mount were clear to all. It was evident that there would be elements within the Palestinian community who would oppose the visit and might seek to prevent it. The timing of the visit was also sensitive insofar as it preceded by only a few days the Jewish New Year, a period in which Jewish families traditionally visit the Western Wall which stands at the foot of the Temple Mount.
  86. While the possibility of prohibiting the visit was considered, freedom of access to "sacred places" is expressly enshrined in Israeli legislation and Supreme Court decisions. Freedom of movement of Members of the Knesset, save for reasons of national security, is also expressly provided for in Israeli law. The scope for prohibiting the visit was thus limited.
  87. Against this background, the relevant Israeli authorities consulted with the Palestinian side. These consultations took place both at the level of officials and at the political level. The purpose of the consultations was to identify the possible risks associated with the visit, to reassure the Palestinian side that the Israeli authorities would do whatever they could to limit problematical aspects of the visit, and to try to convince the Palestinian side not to encourage violence and demonstrations during the visit. In this regard, it was indicated that the visit would take place early in the morning, would be relatively short and would not include visits to particular Muslim Holy Sites. The Palestinian side was presented with the route of the proposed visit - as indicated on Aerial Photograph No.1. It was affirmed that Mr Sharon would visit the area in the same way as would any non-Muslim visitor (the Temple Mount being generally open to public access). The relevant Israeli authorities also promised that no attempt would be made to restrict Muslim freedom of access to the Temple Mount during the visit. In short, every effort was made by the Israeli side to minimise the potential for friction and to forestall the possibility of violence.
  88. The consultations with the Palestinian side included a telephone conversation on the proposed visit between Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and the Head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Organisation in the West Bank, Jibril Rajoub, on 26 September 2000 in which, by reference to the contemporaneous note of the conversation, Mr Rajoub indicated "if Mr Sharon refrains from entering the Mosques on Temple Mount, there wouldn't be any problem." On the basis of this consultation and other measures adopted, the visit was not prohibited.
  89. While contacts between Israeli officials and members of the Palestinian Authority suggested that the visit would pass peacefully, residual concerns about violence remained. Of relevance in this context was a communique published by Hamas on 27 September, the day prior to the visit, stating inter alia as follows:
  90. "The Jews have clearly and unequivocally declared their ambition in continuing occupation of Jerusalem and the holy Aqsa Mosque. It is quite clear that plans to demolish the Aqsa Mosque and build the so-called Jewish temple in its place were no longer the aspirations of limited or extremist groups in the Zionist society, as some believed. ...

    We call on our people to head tomorrow Thursday to the holy Aqsa Mosque to confront the terrorist Sharon and prevent him from entering the Mosque and its yards and to check his attempt to desecrate it regardless of sacrifices. Let the masses have a say in rejecting and aborting plans and aggressive ambitions of the Jews and in refusing any agreements or projects that would undermine our people and Nation's rights in Jerusalem, the Aqsa and all sanctities."

  91. Other declarations and communiques calling for opposition to the Sharon visit were published by Fatah, the principal political-military grouping within the PLO answerable directly to Yasser Arafat, and by others.
  92. On the day of the visit, Muslim morning prayers on the Temple Mount took place at around 5.54 am and passed without incident. From around 7.00 am, political figures - both Israeli supporters and detractors of the visit and Palestinian leaders - began arriving on the scene. Palestinian youth - eventually numbering around 1,500 - also began arriving, shouting slogans in an attempt to inflame the situation. Some 1,500 Israeli police were present at the scene in order to forestall violence.
  93. Mr Sharon arrived at the Temple Mount at 7.57 am. There were limited disturbances during the visit, mostly involving stone throwing. The visit lasted 34 minutes, ending at 8.31 am. Mr Sharon visited the site during normal hours in which it was open to tourists. He made no attempt to enter the Mosques.
  94. During the remainder of the day, outbreaks of stone throwing continued on the Temple Mount and in the vicinity leaving 28 Israeli policemen injured, three of whom were hospitalised. There are no accounts of Palestinian injuries on that day.
  95. Significant and orchestrated violence was initiated by Palestinians the following day, 29 September 2000, following Friday prayers. These events are addressed in detail in Parts V and VI below describing what happened and the policies and practices of the Palestinian side during the conflict.

  96.  

     
     
     
     
     

    D. Conclusions in respect of this Part

  97. There is a widespread belief, actively advanced by the Palestinian side, that demonstrations by Palestinian youth took place spontaneously in reaction to the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. That belief is fundamentally flawed. The visit by Mr Sharon, however sensitive, was not the cause of the violence. It was an excuse for a violent campaign, the groundwork for which had already been laid by the Palestinian leadership. The object of the violence was the creation of new facts on the ground - the bringing about of a new reality to bolster the Palestinian position in its relations with Israel. The means to this end were the inevitable Palestinian casualties - inevitable because of the confrontational practices that would be pursued by the Palestinians.
  98. The foundations for the present conflict were laid long before Ariel Sharon announced his intention to visit the Temple Mount. The seeds of the conflict are to be found in the policies pursued by the Palestinian leadership - the hostile propaganda, the military training of Palestinian children, the failure to confiscate illegal weapons, the excessive growth in the numbers of the Palestinian Police, the revolving door policy in respect of terrorist detainees, etc.
  99. The immediate causes of the present conflict were thus the significant setbacks to the Palestinian diplomatic agenda from July 2000 - the failure of the Camp David Summit, the widespread perception (including in the Arab world) of Palestinian responsibility for this failure, the cautioning against a unilateral declaration of statehood on 13 September 2000 and the decision of the Palestinian leadership on 10 September 2000 to postpone such a declaration. In the face of these developments, violence was a means to an end; the regaining of the diplomatic initiative.
* * *
PART V

WHAT HAPPENED: AN OUTLINE OF EVENTS

  1. On 27 September 2000, a roadside bomb attack against Israelis took place at Netzarim Junction in the Gaza Strip. It was not apparent at this point that this was the start of the Palestinian campaign of violence against Israelis. On the evening of 28 September 2000, following the visit of Mr Sharon to the Temple Mount, the Israeli police authorities took the view that the situation was unlikely to deteriorate further. Persons who had been detained during the course of the violence of that day were accordingly released to return home.
  2. On 29 September 2000, the day after the Sharon visit, following Friday prayers, a violent outburst took place at the Temple Mount. The oration in the El-Aksa Mosque was given that day by Sheikh Hian Al-Adrisi to a congregation of around 22,000. The following is an extract from his address:
  3. "It is not a mistake that the Koran warns us of the hatred of the Jews and put them at the top of the list of the enemies of Islam. Today the Jews recruit the world against the Muslims and use all kinds of weapons. They are plundering the dearest place to the Muslims, after Mecca and Medina and threaten the place the Muslims have faced at first when they prayed and the third holiest city after Mecca and Medina. They want to erect their temple on that place.

    This is the first time in the Muslim history that we hear a public demand from Israel to build a synagogue on the El Aksa square. The council of Rabbis is talking of a synagogue in order not to incite the atmosphere, but they actually intend to build their temple on the land of El Aksa and not a synagogue. This is the first time in the Muslim history that they demand a piece of the area near the El Aksa and they think that the D day has arrived to storm the El Aksa mosque and drive the Muslims out of it, they intend to enforce their sovereignty over the place by building the temple. We say to them: if you think that the time has come we will prove to you that it is the time to put an end to your arrogance, and that you will bring upon yourselves destruction and ruin. The visit of the General Sharon on September 28th 2000 does not bring the imaginary peace closer, but the flaming of the hate and enmity. Sharon came escorted with thousands of soldiers securing him but the masses of Muslims failed the visit and threw stones and garbage and did not let him enter the Al-Haram Al-Qudsi mosques.

    The Muslims are ready to sacrifice their lives and blood to protect the Islamic nature of Jerusalem and El Aksa! The Jews and their leader know better than that."

  4. No interpretation can be put on these words other than that they were designed to inflame passions and to convey to the congregation the impression that the El Aksa mosque was under threat. It is also clear that the sermon was a prelude to violence already planned; part of a coordinated initiative of confrontation.
  5. Following the conclusion of the prayers, Palestinians began throwing stones from the Temple Mount area towards the Western Wall which stands at the foot of, and below, the Mount (see Aerial Photograph No.1). As the 29 September was the eve of the Jewish New Year, this area was crowded with Jewish worshippers. In the face of the attack, the police were compelled to evacuate the Western Wall area.
  6. At around 13.22 on the same day, the police station at the Temple Mount came under a violent and sustained attack from Palestinians. For purposes of rescuing those trapped inside, the police forcibly entered the Temple Mount around the area of the police station.
  7. Significant levels of violence continued throughout the day. During the afternoon, Radio Palestine called upon Palestinians to assemble at the Temple Mount. The numbers of rioters increased. In addition to stone throwing, Molotov cocktails were also used against Israeli police in East Jerusalem. There were, additionally, a number of shooting incidents by Palestinians against Israeli forces. Palestinian sources reported 4 - 7 people killed. Fourteen Israeli policemen were injured.
  8. The violence continued thereafter fanned by calls to arms and incitement to violence by the Palestinian leadership. The following is an extract from the Friday sermon by Dr Ahmad Abu-Halabia, a member of the "Fatwa Council" appointed by the Palestinian Authority and the former acting Rector of the Islamic University in Gaza, delivered in the Zayd bin Sultan Nahyan mosque in Gaza on 13 October 2000, the day after the lynching of the Israeli reservists in Ramallah, and carried live on Palestinian television:
  9. "The Jews are Jews, whether Labour or Likud, the Jews are Jews. They do not have any moderates or any advocates of peace. They are all liars. They are the ones who must be butchered and killed. As Allah the Almighty said: 'Fight them'. Allah will torture them by your hands and will humiliate them and will help you to overcome them, and will relieve the minds of the believers. ... Our people must unite in one trench, and receive armaments from the Palestinian leadership to confront the Jews. ... Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. Whenever you meet them, kill them. Wherever you are, kill those Jews and those Americans who are like them - and those who stand with them - they are all in one trench, against the Arabs and the Muslims - because they established Israel here, in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine. They created it in order that it be the outpost of their civilisation - and the vanguard of their army, and to be the sword of the West and the Crusaders, hanging over the necks of the Muslim monotheists, the Muslims in this land. They wanted the Jews to be the spearhead for them..."
  10. Since the outbreak of violence, there have been around 9,000 attacks by Palestinians against Israelis - civilians, police and military - virtually all life threatening. Of these, some 2,700 involved the use of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, explosives of other kinds. Some 500 Israelis have been injured in these attacks and 39 killed. Around 292 Palestinians have been killed and around 9,000 injured. Although accurate figures are impossible to come by, independent sources have claimed that, of the Palestinians injured, around 20% have been injured by live-fire, around 40% by rubber bullets and around 30% by the inhalation of tear gas. In around 10% of cases the cause of injury is unknown.
  11. The specific polices and practices of both sides that have led to these casualties are examined in the following sections. Given the large number of incidents, it is not possible, in the context of the present Statement, to describe events in detail. It is important, however, that the Committee has an appreciation of certain fundamental elements of the conflict that is taking place.
  12. Save in exceptional circumstances, Israeli forces - police and military - have not initiated action. They have only acted when confronted by an immediate threat to life or limb as a result of attacks by Palestinians. In so doing, they have acted in self-defence or in the defence of others. The principal exception to the policy of not initiating action has been in specific circumstances in which Israeli forces have acted in response to a Palestinian attack but have targeted a point distinct from that of the immediate source of the initial Palestinian attack. This issue is addressed in more detail in Part VII below in the context of the review of Israeli policies and practices. By way of example for present purposes, Israeli forces attacked the Fatah headquarters in Bet Lahiya on 12 October 2000 following the lynching of the two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah earlier that day. On that occasion, Israel issued a warning of an impending attack. There were no Palestinian casualties as a result of the Israeli action. The Fatah headquarters were, however, damaged.
  13. In the majority of cases, Palestinian attacks against Israelis have taken the form of a large number of Palestinians, invariably in the hundreds and sometimes greater, usually including a live-fire dimension, attacking either a small number of Israeli civilians or a small number of Israeli troops. Typically, Israeli troops coming under attack, or responding to an attack, have numbered less than 20. On many occasions, this number is lower. Attacks have generally taken place on roads used by Israelis to reach settlements or Israeli Defence Force ("IDF") positions or at strategic junctions or other sites at which there is a limited Israeli presence. As Maps No.2 and No.3 appended hereto illustrate, attacks, even simply by reference to the major flashpoints of conflict, have occurred over a very wide geographic area. They invariably occur without warning and involve the Palestinian attackers travelling to the point of attack.
  14. Maps No.2 and No.3, indicating major flashpoints of conflict in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively, and Aerial Photographs Nos.2A, 2B, 3A and 3B depicting the Netzarim and Ayosh Junctions, illustrate the position.

  15.  

     
     
     
     
     

    A. The Gaza Strip

  16. Turning, first, to the situation in the Gaza Strip. As will be apparent from a review of Map No.3, most of the major flashpoints of conflict have occurred on roads used by Israeli military forces and Israeli civilians. Attacks have also occurred at and around Israeli settlements and around IDF positions. In most cases, the attacks have taken place some distance from Palestinian centres of population. Thus, attacks have occurred repeatedly along the roads from the Karni Crossing to the Netzarim Junction and from the Kissufim Crossing to the Katif Junction, at the Netzarim and Katif Junctions, and around the Israeli settlements of Kfar Darom, Nezer Hazzani, Katif, Newe Dekalim, Gadid, Selaw, Morag and Dugit. Other major flashpoints of conflicts have been at IDF positions. The number of Israeli troops typically stationed at crossing points, junctions and settlements is between 10 - 15, including during the course of the present conflict. This issue is addressed further below.
  17. The Netzarim Junction, one of the major flashpoints of conflict, illustrates the position that pertains generally throughout the Gaza Strip. This is shown on Aerial Photographs No. 2A and 2B.
  18. As will be evident from Map No.3 showing the Gaza Strip, the Netzarim Junction is a road junction en route from the Karni Crossing to the Israeli settlement of Netzarim. The Junction is around 1.5 km from Netzarim. It intersects the road between Gaza City and the Palestinian refugee camps of Nuserat and El Bureij. Nuserat and Bureij are around 3.5 km from the Junction. Gaza City is around 4 km from the Junction. The layout is clearly visible from Aerial Photograph 2A.
  19. In accordance with the Interim Agreement, Israeli authorities "have all necessary responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security activity, including Israeli patrols" on the Karni-Netzarim road. The Junction is relatively distant from points of Palestinian habitation. Being en route to the Israeli settlement of Netzarim, it is, however, a point that has special security importance.
  20. As is shown on Aerial Photograph No.2B, a small IDF position is located at the Junction. This typically comprises a unit of 13 Israeli soldiers. On occasion, numbers have risen to a maximum of 20. The IDF position is diagonally adjacent to a Palestinian Police post. Behind the IDF position, the Palestinian Authority built a number of large towers. As these were used as a base for live-fire attacks on the IDF position in recent weeks, they have since been destroyed.
  21. The Netzarim Junction has been one of the major points of confrontation in recent weeks involving heavy gun battles raging over many hours. It is the place at which the 12 year old child Mohammed al-Dura was tragically killed on 30 September 2000, the pictures of this event being shown worldwide on television.
  22. Netzarim Junction is a small Israeli military checkpoint relatively distant from Palestinian centres of population. Its object is to secure the road to the settlement of Netzarim to ensure the security of Israelis at a point that in the past had been the scene of violent attacks against Israeli civilians. To engage in attacks on the IDF position, Palestinians have to travel some distance, either from Gaza City or from Nuserat and El Bureij. Simply because of its geographic location, it is not a point at which spontaneous confrontation can occur.
  23. Israeli troops have not sought confrontation. A small unit has remained at the IDF position at the Junction. Over the past 93 days, this position has come under repeated, extremely violent attack by large numbers of Palestinians, often heavily armed. These attacks have been planned. Those perpetrating the attack - armed Palestinian militia as well as stone throwers - have had to travel to the Junction to pursue their objective.
  24. The same pattern has largely been replayed across the Gaza Strip in respect of other points of conflict. Attacks have occurred on roads and at junctions, settlements and IDF positions that in the main have been relatively removed from Palestinian centres of population. Incidents have taken the form of large numbers of Palestinians, frequently armed, travelling to attack small numbers of relatively isolated Israeli civilians or troops. The attacks have not taken the form of symbolic stone throwing and protest. They have left the Israeli targets of the attacks in no doubt that, absent firm resistance, their fate was likely to be the same as that of the two Israeli reserve soldiers lynched in Ramallah.

  25.  

     
     
     
     
     

    B. The West Bank

  26. The same pattern is evident on the West Bank. The major flashpoints of conflict are shown on Map No.2. As will be apparent from this map, the principal points of confrontation have been on roads leading to Israeli settlements or, in some cases, to IDF positions, at the Israeli settlements themselves and at Jewish Holy Sites - such as Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, the Shalom Al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho and Rachel's Tomb in the outskirts of Bethlehem - situated within or abutting areas under Palestinian jurisdiction in respect of which special arrangements have been agreed. Given the complicated geography of Palestinian centres of population and Israeli settlements on the West Bank, the two populations often live in close proximity to one another. The flashpoints of conflict have not, however, been accidental places of confrontation. As with the Gaza Strip, the points of confrontation have involved significant numbers of Palestinian attackers converging on points from which to launch attacks on Israeli civilians or soldiers. In the vast majority of cases, attacks have occurred on roads leading to settlements, the point on the road chosen by the attackers being, from the Israeli perspective, relatively random in the sense that the attack could just as well have occurred at some other point along the road. It has not been possible therefore to prepare for attacks at specific locations.
  27. It is worth recalling here the details of the Fatah declaration published in Nablus on 6 October 2000 referred to in paragraph 161(b) above, a declaration that was one of many issued by Fatah throughout the conflict. In this declaration, Fatah called for an expansion of the circle of attacks and coordination between the different groups undertaking the attacks and stated the importance of striking at settlements and other concentrations of Israelis. As this indicates, there was a coordinated Palestinian policy driving the attacks of which Israel was only imperfectly aware.
  28. As in the case of the attacks in the Gaza Strip, the method of those in the West Bank typically involved large numbers of Palestinians, frequently heavily armed, moving to points from which to attack small numbers of relatively isolated Israeli civilians or soldiers. Israeli troops coming under attack, or responding to an attack, have seldom been larger than 20. Attacks have occurred over a wide geographic area, invariably without any warning. They have been extremely violent, leaving the intended Israeli targets in no doubt as to the fate that would befall them if they fell into the hands of their attackers.
  29. The Ayosh Junction, indicated on Aerial Photographs No.3A and 3B, has been a recurring flashpoint of conflict in the West Bank. Situated in the outskirts of the Palestinian city of Ramallah and the town of El Bire, it is nevertheless located at a relatively open point some distance from any significant dwellings. It is on the road to the Israeli settlement of Beit-El and an IDF position located close by. The Junction is located in Area C. In other words, it is an area which, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, Israel retains security responsibility. However, it abuts onto Area A, Ramallah, in which the Palestinian Authority has full security competence to the exclusion of that of Israel. Attacks on the Junction can and are typically planned from within Ramallah, with attackers retreating into Ramallah after the attack.
  30. As in the case of Netzarim Junction, incidents at Ayosh Junction have typically involved attacks by large numbers of Palestinians, including an armed component, against small numbers of Israelis.
  31. Map No.2 indicates over 70 major flashpoints of conflict in the West Bank. There are, in addition to these major points of conflict, also a large number of other points of conflict throughout the area, no less threatening to those attacked. It is not possible at this point, in the context of this initial Statement, to describe the events at each of these locations. If warranted, Israel would, however, be prepared to expand upon this description and analysis in detail in later submissions to the Committee. The preceding review is, however, accurate as a general description of events in the West Bank.
  32. Two other aspects of Palestinian attacks on the West Bank call for further comment - attacks launched from areas over which Israel has no jurisdiction and on-going heavy machine gun attacks against Israeli civilian centres within Israel.
  33. On the first point, as Map No.2 indicates, many of the major flashpoints of conflicts are at points abutting Areas A and B, ie, areas in respect of which the Palestinian Authority either has complete jurisdiction in respect of security matters to the exclusion of Israel (Area A) or in which it has extensive jurisdiction with overriding (although in practice residual) Israeli jurisdiction in respect of security matters (Area B). In either case, these are areas which are very substantially, and in some cases wholly, under Palestinian control.
  34. In many cases, as was indicated in respect of attacks from Ramallah at Ayosh Junction, attacks have been initiated against Israelis from within Area A or Area B. Attackers who have proceeded outside these areas have invariably retreated into these areas subsequently. Given the status of these areas, Israel has not pursued these attackers or been in a position to take effective steps to prevent such attacks.
  35. On the issue of on-going heavy machine gun attacks against Israeli civilian centres in Israel, the situation at Gilo illustrates the point.
  36. As Aerial Photograph No.4 indicates, the Israeli neighbourhood of Gilo, part of the city of Jerusalem, lies approximately 4.5 km from the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, at the heart of the City. It is approximately 0.5 km from the Palestinian town of Beit Jalla.
  37. Almost daily over the course of the present conflict, Gilo, an Israeli residential neighbourhood of Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, has come under machine gun attack from Palestinians based in Beit Jalla. Families have had to be evacuated. Where possible, the IDF has erected fortifications in an attempt to ensure some protection to the residents. Despite these measures, a number of residents have been injured, in some cases seriously. The situation in Gilo is in every aspect akin to a city under continuous attack in a war.

  38.  

     
     
     
     
     

    C. IDF numbers and deployment

  39. In the preceding sections the point has been made that, typically, Palestinian attacks have been targeted at small numbers of Israeli soldiers, invariably less than 20. As the violence has now been protracted and as commonly quoted statistics suggest that the IDF is a sizeable force, the question may be raised as to why Israel failed to deploy larger numbers of troops at particular points of conflict with a view to minimising Palestinian casualties by way of deterrence and the greater use of non-lethal methods of response. Aspects of this element - notably the issue of non-lethal methods of response - are addressed in Part VII below dealing with Israeli polices and practices in the course of the present conflict. It may be helpful at this stage to make a number of general observations concerning the numbers and deployment of Israeli military forces in the course of the present conflict.
  40. The IDF is overwhelmingly a conscript army. In addition to an initial period of conscription, Israelis who have served in the armed forces usually return to serve a period of reserve duty on an annual basis. For this reason, the IDF is thought of as being a sizeable force since it consists, in one form or another, of a significant portion of the Israeli population. This has been a matter of historical necessity.
  41. As a general policy, Israel has been cautious about sending soldiers on temporary reserve duty to major points of conflict in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The reason for this is an appreciation that the situation prevailing in these areas would be better addressed by its full-time force which may be better placed to respond to the threats posed by Palestinian attacks. Although this policy has not been followed in all cases - and, in particular, experienced reserve officers have in some cases been entrusted with tasks such as securing Israeli settlements or ensuring safe passage - this has been the general approach.
  42. The size of the full-time IDF force is, however, relatively small. This force is principally responsible for securing Israel's borders. A significant proportion are thus stationed along the Lebanese border, which has been a source of particular friction in recent months. Others are stationed on the border with Syria. Still others are located at strategic points elsewhere around the country. At a purely pragmatic level, the reality is therefore that the numbers of experienced, full-time Israeli troops available for deployment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in response to the events of recent weeks is limited.
  43. Coupled with this are three other elements. First, as has already been stated, there have been a large number of major flashpoints in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Map No.2, in respect of the West Bank, indicates over 70 major flashpoints. Map No.3, in respect of the Gaza Strip, indicates over 30. With around 9,000 incidents over the past 93 days, it will be evident that these 100 or so major flashpoints of conflict represent only the tip of the iceberg. In addition to the points of conflict on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there are also IDF positions and around 150 Israeli settlement in these areas which must be protected. In practice, therefore, there are a large number of points at which troops are needed.
  44. Second, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are areas in a process of transition to Palestinian control. This is the subject of the permanent status negotiations.
  45. Third, although some of the points of violence have been predictable - the Netzarim Junction, the Ayosh Junction, and others - the timing of violence has not been within Israeli control. In most cases in which the points of violence may be predictable, the locations are not such as would be conducive to the stationing of a sizeable force. The stationing of a sizeable IDF force at such locations has thus not recommended itself. In circumstances in which neither the points nor the timing of Palestinian attacks has been predictable, this option has not even presented itself.
  46. For all these reasons, the numbers of Israeli troops that have been targeted by Palestinians in particular attacks have invariably been small. Israel might have responded differently. It is not convinced that, had it done so, such a policy would have been conducive to a more effective and appropriate handling of the conflict at either the political or the military level. A large contingent of Israeli forces coming under live-fire attack by a large contingent of Palestinians is unlikely to have resulted in fewer Palestinian casualties. Consciously, therefore, Israel placed its soldiers in harms way. In overwhelming measure, they have behaved in a measured and responsible manner. Other elements relevant to this assessment are addressed in Part VII below.

  47.  

     
     
     
     
     

    D. Diplomatic initiatives to stop the violence

  48. From the outset, attempts were made at the political level to stop the violence. On 4 October 2000, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met French President Chirac and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Paris. "Points of Understanding" were hammered out, including a commitment on the part of both sides "to reduce and eliminate friction and confrontation". At the last moment, after the text had been finalised, Yasser Arafat refused to sign.
  49. Both sides met again on 16 - 17 October 2000 at Sharm El-Sheikh, a Summit hosted jointly by President Mubarak of Egypt and US President Clinton. Others present included His Majesty King Abdullah of Jordan, Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Summit concluded with an agreed statement by President Clinton, one element of which was the establishment of the present Fact-Finding Committee. Other elements, equally integral to President Clinton's statement were the agreement by both sides to issue public statements unequivocally calling for an end of violence and the necessity of a pathway back to the negotiations. The relevant parts of President Clinton's statement are as follows:
  50. "Let me summarise what has been agreed so there will be no misunderstanding.

    Our primary objective has been to end the current violence so we can begin again to resume our efforts towards peace. The leaders have agreed on three basic objectives and steps to realise them:

    First, both sides have agreed to issue public statements unequivocally calling for and end of violence. They also agreed to take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation, eliminate points of friction, ensure an end of violence and incitement, maintain calm and prevent recurrence of recent events.

    To accomplish this, both sides will act immediately to return the situation to that which existed prior to the current crisis in areas such as restoring law and order, redeployment of forces, eliminating points of friction, enhancing security co-operation and ending the closure and opening the Gaza airport. The United States will facilitate security co-operation between the parties as needed.

    Second, the United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, a committee of fact finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The committee's report will be shared by the US President with the UN Secretary-General and the parties prior to publication. A final report should be submitted under the auspices of the US President for publication.

    Third, if we are to address the underlying causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there must be a pathway back to negotiations and a resumption of efforts to reach a permanent status agreement based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and subsequent understandings. Towards this end, the leaders have agreed that the United States would consult with the parties within the next two weeks about how to move forward."

  51. In accordance with the first point of agreement indicated in President Clinton's statement, Prime Minister Barak made the following statement on 17 October 2000:
  52. "The President of the United States has today presented the Sharm El-Sheikh Statement, which expresses the commitment of all parties to put an end to violence, to restore calm immediately and to ensure regional stability.

    To this end, detailed security understandings have been agreed upon in all related issues. These understandings were deposited with the United States, which will monitor their implementation.

    Together, these understandings are designed to allow for the cessation of the current wave of violence, the elimination of points of friction and for the prevention of a recurrence of these events. Both sides made a commitment to act gradually to return the situation to that which existed prior to the current crisis, to eliminate flashpoints, and to enhance security cooperation between the sides, to lift the closure and to reopen the Dahaniye Airport.

    We intend to exhaust every avenue to implement the undertakings of the Sharm el-Sheikh Statement. Accordingly, upon our return to Israel I instructed the heads of the security forces to take all necessary measures to implement the Sharm el-Sheikh Statement, and to immediately establish contact with their American and Palestinian counterparts in order to work together for this purpose without compromising their duty to protect the nation's citizens and members of the armed forces.

    I would like to stress that the IDF and the Israeli Police will act decisively to stop the violence and prevent further casualties. They and only they will ensure the security of Israel.

    Israel intends to implement the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings and to monitor their implementation carefully as this is their ultimate test.

    During the last weeks we have seen a mounting wave of violence causing the loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives. We deeply regret this.

    At this point we have another opportunity to take the path of stability, coexistence and cooperation. I expect that our Palestinian neighbours share this hope with us."

  53. In a statement read on Palestinian television that evening, the Palestinian leadership was quoted as having given instructions to Palestinian forces to follow up on the activities agreed on at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit.
  54. As is evident from the Statement by Prime Minister Barak, the two sides also agreed upon "detailed security understandings" at the Summit. These were not made public "in order to facilitate their implementation". The understandings were deposited with the United States, which was to monitor their implementation. To Israel's regret, the Palestinian side has not taken any significant steps to give effect to their terms.
  55. On 1 November 2000, in the light of continuing violence, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat met in an attempt to reach an agreement on the cessation of violence. Following this meeting, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat concluded an understanding. This was to be issued as a "Joint Statement on the Cessation of Violence" on 2 November 2000 as follows:

  56.  

     
     
     
     
     

    "The Israeli and Palestinian sides have agreed tonight to issue a joint call for the cessation of violence.

    I hereby call all forces and parties to refrain from violence, incitement and the use of force in order to restore peace and calm.

    We undertook to work together to implement the Sharem El-Sheikh understandings as presented by President Clinton at the closing of the Sharem El-Sheikh Summit last month. These understandings shall be implemented in the manner concluded between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Barak on the night of November 1, 2000.

    The sides share the hope for a future of stability, prosperity and peace, when two separate political entities will coexist side by side in good neighbourly relations. The sides undertake to exert every effort to realise this dream of Peace of the Brave in dignity, fairness and mutual respect."

  57. Before the Joint Statement could be issued, a car bomb was exploded in Jerusalem, killing two and injuring dozens. The violence continues.
* * *
PART VI

PALESTINIAN POLICIES AND PRACTICES

  1. There are many images from the current conflict. For Israelis, there is an enduring image, captured on film, a warning to all - civilians, police, military - of the nature of the threat that they face from their Palestinian attackers; of the fate that awaits them if they are unable to resist; if the attack gets too close. It is an image of barbarism - of the lynch in Ramallah.
  2. A British photographer working on a pictorial study of Palestinian refugees stumbled on the event after the initial attack in the Ramallah police station. He did not witness that aspect. He subsequently described what he did see in The Sunday Telegraph, a respected British daily newspaper. The following is an extract:
  3. "I had arrived in Ramallah at about 10.30 in the morning and was getting into a taxi on the main road to go to Nablus, where there was to be a funeral that I wanted to film, when all of a sudden there came a big crowd of Palestinians shouting and running down the hill from the police station.

    I got out of the car to see what was happening and saw that they were dragging something behind them. Within moments they were in front of me and, to my horror, I saw that it was a body, a man they were dragging by the feet. The lower part of his body was on fire and the upper part had been shot at, and the head beaten so badly that it was a pulp, like a red jelly.

    I thought he was a soldier because I could see the remains of the khaki trousers and boots. My God, I thought, they've killed this guy. He was dead, he must have been dead, but they were still beating him, madly, kicking his head. They were like animals.

    They were just a few feet in front of me and I could see everything. Instinctively, I reached for my camera. I was composing the picture when I was punched in the face by a Palestinian. Another Palestinian pointed right at me shouting 'no picture, no picture!', while another guy hit me in the face and said 'give me your film!'.

    I tried to get the film out but they were all grabbing me and the one guy just pulled the camera off me and smashed it to the floor. I knew I had lost the chance to take the photograph that would have made me famous and I had lost my favourite lens that I'd used all over the world, but I didn't care. I was scared for my life.

    At the same time, the guy that looked like a soldier was being beaten and the crowd was getting angrier and angrier, shouting 'Allah akbar' - God is great. They were dragging the dead man around the street like a cat toying with a mouse. It was the most horrible thing that I have ever seen and I have reported from Congo, Kosovo, many bad places. In Kosovo, I saw Serbs beating an Albanian but it wasn't like this. There was such hatred, such unbelievable hatred and anger distorting their faces.

    The worst thing was that I realised the anger that they were directing at me was the same as that which they'd had toward the soldier before dragging him from the police station and killing him. Somehow I escaped and ran and ran not knowing where I was going. I never saw the other guy they killed, the one they threw out of the window.

    I thought that I'd got to know the Palestinians well. I've made six trips this year and had been going to Ramallah every day for the past 16 days. I thought they were kind, hospitable people. I know they are not all like this and I'm a very forgiving person but I'll never forget this. It was murder of the most barbaric kind. When I think about it, I see that man's head, all smashed. I know that I'll have nightmares for the rest of my life."

  4. An Italian film crew was present in the Ramallah police station. It caught on film the unrestrained brutality of the initial attack. The images are horrific. The full sequence has not been released to the public out of sensitivity for the families of the victims and in order not to inflame the situation further. Israel is in possession of additional evidence which portrays the horror of this event.
  5. The raw reality of the events in Ramallah, of the bomb attack on the children's school bus at Kfar Darom, of the destruction of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and of many other equally disturbing events, are, however, an integral part of the fabric of the current conflict. Whatever might by the declared intent of the Palestinian leadership, these events convey a message to Israelis - - this is not a protest; this is not a riot; these are not demonstrations to convey a sense of urgency in the peace process; this is a war; if we catch you, this is the fate that you can expect to receive.
  6. Israel was cautious about the establishment of a fact-finding committee when the matter was first discussed. This did not stem from a lack of faith in the strength of Israel's position. Nor was it a concern about the balance that the as yet unidentified members of the Committee would bring to their task. The caution stemmed rather from a concern that, at some level, the process in which the Committee would inevitably become engaged would be a process of uncovering the barbarism, fear, hatred and suffering, and that this was not the best means to find, in the words of President Clinton "a pathway back to negotiations and the resumption of efforts to reach a permanent status agreement". Israel would be more than happy to be proved wrong in this assessment. It trusts in the wisdom of the Members of the Committee.
  7. Be that as it may, the issue here is the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in the course of the present conflict.

  8.  

     
     
     
     
     

    A. The form of the Palestinian action

  9. Leaving aside the causes of the conflict and questions of spontaneity, once the violence began it very quickly took on a familiar form, shaped by Fatah declarations and Tanzim organisation. That form is recognizable the world over. It is not unique to the Middle East. Writing in 1996 in the context of an article on developing non-lethal methods of riot control, a US military officer who had been deployed to Somalia as part of the US contingent in the UN peacekeeping operation there, identified various characteristics of the "tactical environment" of "riots" such as those which the UN forces faced in Somalia in the period June - November 1993. Addressing the issue that such "riots" are carefully organised, Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton observed as follows:
  10. "Far from being spontaneous outbursts of popular rage, many riots are well organised by faction leaders with designated chains of command and specific instructions to subordinate elements. Command and control is accomplished by runners, local or cellular phones, or hand-held radios. Rioters can be broken down into three basic groups.

    First are the armed fighters, who generally are a relatively small cadre with small arms and various hand-held antitank and antiaircraft weapons, although, like Mohammed Farah Aideed's militia or the Serbs, they can also have heavier weapons. These fighters can show a high degree of sophistication in their tactics and should not be underestimated.

    Second, the semiarmed rioters are more numerous. They normally consist of younger men, older boys, and some women, and they are armed with such weapons as clubs, sticks, tools, and knives or spears. They are used to attack or harass other factions and riot-control forces and to create gaps or find weaknesses through which gunmen can travel.

    Third, the number of unarmed supporters can equal or exceed that of the semiarmed group. These supporters act as a living screen around their armed and semiarmed fighters. Normally, they are not active in fighting other than by throwing rocks. They will scatter if fired upon, and their presence in the riot just causes confusion - which is their intent.

    All three of these groups usually operate under some type of direction through an identified and accepted chain of command, be it familial (tribal), religious, political.

    Riots may involve large numbers of women and children. Many of our potential opponents understand only too well our squeamishness about injuring women and children - or even detaining and searching them - and they will capitalise on this. Factions in Somalia used large groups of their women and children (active rioters all) to screen the movements of their gunmen and grenade throwers with their bodies. We can expect to see this tactic duplicated in the future in other places."

  11. Casualties in Somalia amongst the local population inflicted by the UN peacekeeping force were high. Addressing this issue, UN Military Spokesman Major David Stockwell stated that "[e]veryone on the ground in the vicinity was a combatant, because they meant to do us harm."
  12. The events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not slot cleanly into the template for violence described by Lt. Col. Stanton. There are, however, evident parallels, notably, the use of children, the operation of gunmen from within groups of stone throwers, the willingness to incur "civilian" casualties, and more.
  13. This Statement will now turn to address more directly Palestinian policies and practices in the course of the conflict.

  14.  

     
     
     
     
     

    B. Palestinian policies and practices

  15. Key elements of Palestinian policies and practices in the course of the present conflict have already been touched upon in passing in preceding parts of this Statement. These include the live-fire dimension of the conflict, the nature and in many cases the barbarism of the attacks, the targeting of Israeli civilians, the initiation of attacks against Israelis from within Palestinian civilian locations, hostile propaganda and incitement to violence, the training and involvement of children, the availability and use of illegal weapons, and the release of terrorist detainees. In addition to these elements, other issues warrant comment, including the role of the Palestinian Police and the involvement of the Tanzim, the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites, the resort to terrorist bombings in places like Jerusalem, Kfar Darom, Hadera, and the abuse of protective symbols such as the Red Crescent and of accepted principles relating to the relief of the wounded. Given the constraints of the present Statement, these issues are addressed briefly below. Israel is prepared to expand upon these elements in detail in later submissions to the Committee, including, where appropriate, by the use of documentary, video, photographic and other evidence.

  16.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (i) Hostile propaganda and incitement to violence

  17. In the context of the preceding review of the causes of the violence, reference was made to children's television programmes broadcast on Palestinian television and to books in use in Palestinian schools. The material on these elements is extensive and can be developed in detail. In the context of describing what happened, reference was made to sermons by Muslim clerics during the course of Friday prayers. An extract from one such sermon is shown on the orientation video attached hereto as Exhibit I. This material, too, is extensive and can be developed in detail. Reference has also been made to the training of children at so-called "summer camps", activities that have as an integral dimension the incitement of children to hatred and violence against Jews and Israelis. A BBC film clip of these camps is included on the orientation video. There is more material on this aspect as well. Finally, reference has been made to Fatah declarations and Hamas communiques which call upon Palestinians to attack Jews and Israelis. This material, also, is copious.
  18. These policies and practices of propaganda and incitement have been a central and on-going feature of the violence. The propaganda and incitement has, however, been more extensive than the instances just highlighted suggest. So, for example, as is shown on the orientation video, frequently repeated broadcasts on Palestinian television exhort the Palestinian population to make molotov cocktails and store them in their homes as they would food. Prominent Palestinian leaders are shown on television and heard on radio making inflammatory speeches at funerals and elsewhere calling on the crowd to kill Israelis. Daily current affairs programmes call upon Palestinians to "continue the popular and noble actions". Other broadcasts call upon "the public to immediately take to streets in order to express its rage." These are all official statements, conveying the views of the Palestinian leadership. They are not the result of omissions on the part of the Palestinian Authority to control such broadcasts. This is an active policy of incitement.
  19. At a more subtle level (if this is the correct description), Palestinian television repeatedly - every few minutes - broadcasts images of the conflict accompanied by a commentary designed to inflame. By way of example, the death of Mohammed al-Dura was broadcast every few minutes for days on end accompanied by a commentary describing his death as an execution. Close-up photographs of the dead and wounded are also shown regularly and repeatedly.
  20. All of the practices referred to can be documented. Israel is in the process of compiling this material in a systematic fashion in the event that these are issues that the Committee wishes to examine further.

  21.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (ii) The involvement of children

  22. The training of children as young as seven in military techniques and methods of violence has already been described. Images of and reports on the "summer camps" are contained on the orientation video. Reference has also been made to the "conscription" of children under 18 into the Tanzim (the Fatah militia) and the Fatah Youth cadres, the Shabibah, in which role the young recruits are trained in the use of, and carry, arms.
  23. The involvement of children on the streets, in attacks against Israelis, is self-evident. What is less evident is that the participation of children has often been actively procured by the Palestinian Authority. In many instances, the Political Guidance Department of the Palestinian Authority has made arrangements for children to leave school especially for the purpose of taking part in the hostilities. The children are referred to in laudatory terms by Yasser Arafat and others within the Palestinian leadership as the "Generals of Stones" who "defeated the IDF Generals".
  24. The role of the children is not simply as stone throwers. Often, they carry and use weapons. As video footage shows, the role of the stone throwers is also to act as cover for the activities of armed Palestinian elements, such as the Tanzim, who invariably fire at Israelis from within or behind crowds of children.
  25. This practice of conscripting children does not have universal approval in Palestinian circles. Palestinian mothers are increasingly vocal in their opposition to this element. As reported from Tulkarm on the West Bank in USA Today by Matthew Kalman on 8 December 2000, the Tulkarm Women's Union sent a letter of protest to Yasser Arafat demanding that the Palestinian Authority "stop using our children as cannon fodder".
  26. "Our children are being sent into the streets to face heavily armed Israeli soldiers ... The Palestinian Authority must put an end to this phenomenon. We urge you to issue instructions to your police force to stop sending innocent children to their death."
  27. The report of the mothers' protest continues in the following terms:
  28. " 'We don't want to send our sons to the front line, but they are being taken by the Palestinian Authority,' says Aisheh, 43, a mother of six in the West Bank city of Tulkarm. She says she decided to speak out after her 17-year-old son was hit in the head by a rubber bullet last week. He suffered concussion.

    Like other protesting parents, Aisheh declines to allow her full name to be published for fear of reprisals. A nurse from Gaza who spoke out on Palestinian TV against sending children to the flash points was condemned in the Palestinian media as a traitor. Other individuals who refuse to allow their names to be published say they have been threatened by armed Fatah officials for discouraging their children from participating in the clashes.

    ...

    Abu Sharif [a special adviser to Arafat] says Palestinian police are trying to dissuade children from taking part in the clashes with Israeli soldiers. He adds: 'These kids are on the streets. For them, banners and demonstrations are a festival.'

    But Aisheh says the militia of Arafat's Fatah movement and the Palestinian security forces provide transportation and encouragement to children eager to answer the call to combat Israel's continued presence on Arab land."

  29. The involvement of children continues. Live-fire attacks by Palestinian gunmen operating from with "civilian" groups, including children, remains an accepted Palestinian modus operandi.

  30.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iii) Illegal weapons, live-fire attacks, the role of the Palestinian Police and the involvement of the Tanzim

  31. The issue of illegal weapons and the failure by the Palestinian Police to confiscate them as required by the agreements with Israel has already been addressed in detail. For present purposes, it should be recalled that the Interim Agreement and subsequent arrangements agreed limits on both the numbers and types of weapons that could be legally held on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Both elements of these agreements have been breached. Illegal weapons in very significant quantities are held by the Palestinian Police, the Tanzim and other militia, and by the civilian population. These include:
    • pistols,
    • assault rifles and sub-machine guns,
    • machine guns,
    • hand grenades,
    • rocket propelled grenades,
    • grenade launchers,
    • anti-tank missiles,
    • shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles, cannons and machine guns,
    • mortars,
    • mines, and
    • high explosives.
  32. Of these weapons, the following have been used in attacks against Israelis in the present conflict: pistols, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, machine guns, grenades and explosives. In all, there have been around 2,700 attacks using such weapons in the past 13 weeks.
  33. Empirical evidence as well as hard intelligence information indicates that the principal perpetrators of the live-fire attacks against Israelis have been the Tanzim. Armed action by the Tanzim has gone hand-in-hand with the involvement of key elements of the Palestinian Police, particularly by its "Preventive Security Force" component in the Gaza Strip and by its "General Intelligence" component in the West Bank. Together, these militia have been responsible for attacks on both Israeli troops and civilians, including bomb attacks, such as the one on the children's school bus in Kfar Darom on 20 November 2000, and the frequent shooting incidents targeted at civilians in the West Bank.
  34. By way of further example, the Tanzim, possibly acting with elements of the Palestinian Police, were responsible for infiltrating the IDF position at Kfar Darom on 18 November 2000 in which two Israeli soldiers were killed. They were responsible for an explosion at the southern District Coordination Office in the Gaza Strip on 23 November 2000 in which an Israeli soldier died. They were also responsible for the activation of a series of explosive devices in the Hebron area in October 2000 as well as the placing of a number of such devices in the Bethlehem area during November 2000.
  35. It has largely been the action of the Tanzim that has turned the events of the past weeks into an armed conflict. In addition to live-fire attacks on Israeli civilians and troops, Tanzim units have also been coordinating the activity of others. This dimension of their activity is illustrated by the report of the Belgian television journalist quoted in paragraph 161(a) above which describes the actions of the Tanzim in distributing molotov cocktails to demonstrators in Ramallah.
  36. Israel is prepared to elaborate on these elements in detail in future submissions to the Committee.

  37.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iv) The release of terrorist detainees

  38. The release by the Palestinian Authority of terrorist detainees held in Palestinian prisons in violation of its commitments under the Interim Agreement and other related agreements was addressed in detail in Part IV. As was there noted that some 50 detainees were released by the Palestinian Authority in the period following the failure of the Camp David Summit to the start of violence in late September 2000.
  39. Following the outbreak of violence, a further 80 or so detainees were released by the Palestinian Authority including the following:
  40. 'Abbas Uthman Ahmad 'Awiwi Hamas
    Abd Al-Aziz Ali Abd Al-Hafiz Rantisi Hamas
    Abd Al-Halim Nait Halil Hijjah Islamic Jihad
    'Abdallah 'Ali Abdallah Fara Hamas
    'Abdallah Yusuf Mansi Sakran Hamas
    Ahmad Amin Muhammad Badran Hamas
    Ahmad Mustafa Yasin Fanni Islamic Jihad
    Ahmad Naji Ahmad Ghandur Hamas
    'Ala' Hayan Jamil Rimawi Hamas
    Amin Shafiq Abd-al-Hamid Dib Hamas
    Anwar 'Ali Yahya Dajjani Hamas
    Anwar Muhammad Ahmed Humran Isalmic Jihad
    'Asad Abd-al-Rahman 'Asad Daqa Islamic Jihad
    Ayman Halid Husain Abu-Hin Hamas
    Ayman Muhammad Sallah Taha Hamas
    Baha al-din Sadeq 'Ali Hatib Hamas
    Bashar Na'im Salim Karmi Hamas
    Bilal Salim Halaf Muhtasab Hamas
    Fahd Fawwaz Muhlis Qasrawi Hamas
    Fallah Tahir Abdallah Nada Hamas
    Fawzi Muhammad Shahhadah Al-Qara' Hamas
    Halid Hasan Ahmad Juma'a Hamas
    Halil Hamed Halil Sakhani Hamas
    Halil Mahmud Ahmad Muhsin Islamic Jihad
    Hamad 'Adballah 'Abd al-Hafiz Hamad Hamas
    Hamdi 'Arafat Halil Muqdad Hamas
    Hasan Ibrahim 'Abdallah Hamaydah Hamas
    Ibrahim Abd Al-Karim Bani 'Awdah Hamas
    Ibrahim Husayn 'Abdallah Abu-Jamus Hamas
    Ibrahim Muhammad Khalid Muqadmah Hamas
    Ibrahim Muhammad Sulayman 'Alwan Hamas
    Ibrahim Rashid Mahmud Sa'id Hamas
    'Imad 'Ali Yahya Dajjani Hamas
    'Imad Ziyyad 'Atwah Abu-Muhsin Hamas
    Isma'il 'Ali 'Abdallah Lawbad Hamas
    Iyad Muhammad Na'if Hardan Islamic Jihad
    Iyad Tawfiq Wadi' Abu Zahara Hamas
    'Izz Al-Din Ramadhan Sa'id Haddad Hamas
    Jamal Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Mansur Hamas
    Jamal Isma'il Da'ud Jarrah Hamas
    Jasir Afif Muhammad Raddad Islamic Jihad
    Jihad Abd Al-Ghani Anis Hasan Hamas
    Karim Nimr 'Abd Mufarajjah Hamas
    Khalid Mahmud Dawud Zakarnah Islamic Jihad
    Mahir Awdah Ahmad Jaramah Hamas
    Mahmud Umar Ahmad Halabi Hamas
    Marwan 'Abd Al-Karim 'Ali 'Isa Hamas
    Muhammad Ahmad Muhammad Bsharat Hamas
    Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Simri Hamas
    Muhammad Irahim Sallah Abu-Shamallah Hamas
    Muhammad Mahmud Muhammad Minrawi Hamas
    Muhammad Naji Muhammad Sabha Hamas
    Muhammad Nimr Hafiz Badwan Islamic Jihad
    Muhammad Qasim Ahmad 'Arda Islamic Jihad
    Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad Rayhan Hamas
    Muharad Hafiz Muhammad Tahir Hamas
    Munir Abd-Al Majid Isma'il Harrub Hamas
    Munir Taysir Amin Katut Hamas
    Munjid Isma'il Awwad Abu-Qubaytah Hamas
    Na'aman Taher Sadeq Tahainah Islamic Jihad
    Nabil Juma'a Tahir Mu'air Islamic Jihad
    Nadim Muhammad Dawud Abu-Halaf Hamas
    Nasir Ahmad Mahmud Sama'nah Hamas
    Nasir Muhammad Yusuf Baghdadi Hamas
    Nasir Mustafa Ahmad 'Asirah Hamas
    Nasir Subhi Ahmad 'Attar Hamas
    Rafiq Ibrahim Husayn Abu-Hani Hamas
    Ra'id Subhi Ahmad 'Attar Hamas
    Riyyadh Husayn 'Abdallah Abu-Zayyid Hamas
    Sa'd Muhammad Abd Al-Halim Sal'us Hamas
    Sa'd Musa'id Sallah 'Arabid Hamas
    Salah Mahmud Husayn Talahm Hamas
    Salim Sulayman 'Id Mahmum Hamas
    Sami Radi Abd Al-Mu'ti 'Aasi Hamas
    Samer Bashir 'Umar Suwaylam Hamas
    Samir Muhammad Hamed 'Abidu Hamas
    Sha'ban Yusuf Wasifi Hamas
    Shadi Fawzi Muhammad Bushkar Hamas
    Shadi Muhammad As'ad Sabbuh Hamas
    Shafiq Ali Sulyman Rada'idah Islamic Jihad
    Tahir Muhammad Tahir Jarar'ah Hamas
    Usama Sulayman Shukri Abu Taha Hamas
    Wa'il Talab Muhammad Nassar Hamas
    Yasir Mustafa Mahmud 'Asidah Hamas
    Yusuf Khalid Yusuf Surakji Hamas
  41. Many of those released have been actively engaged in the violence of recent weeks. Three examples will suffice to illustrate the point.
  42. Awad Silmi, a prominent member of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, was in Palestinian detention for a number of incidents in the past in which Israelis were shot. He was also involved in the planning of a suicide bombing mission in Israel in 1995. He was released in the period prior to the outbreak of the violence and, from the start, played an active role in it. He was killed in a "working accident" on 3 December 2000 while preparing an explosive charge to be placed on the road to the Israeli settlement of Netzarim in the Gaza Strip.
  43. Halil Sakhani is another prominent member of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. He had been held in Palestinian detention for a 1999 attempt to kidnap an Israeli soldier for bargaining purposes. Upon his release from detention by the Palestinian Authority in early October, he became actively involved in the current violence. Together with Awad Silmi, he was involved in preparing an explosive charge to be placed on the road to Netzarim. He was injured in the "working accident" in which Awad Silmi was killed.
  44. Hamdi Muqdad was another prominent member of Hamas. He underwent military training in Sudan in 1995 following which he returned to the Gaza Strip. He was subsequently arrested by Egypt for arms smuggling. He was the leader of a Hamas terrorist cell that attempted to conduct attacks in Israel and was arrested in March 2000. He was released by the Palestinian Authority in early October 2000. He was killed on 6 November 2000 in an attempt to blow up an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
  45. The release of prominent Palestinian detainees has been a significant factor in the present violence, both at the operational level - in the sense that experienced terrorists are released back into the field - and at the level of propaganda and incitement - insofar as these individuals are influential figures within sectors of the Palestinian community intent on encouraging violence.

  46.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (v) The targeting of civilians

  47. A significant feature of Palestinian policy in the present violence has been the targeting of Israeli civilians who were in no manner involved in the conflict. This has taken a number of forms, in particular, the targeting of civilians in their homes, the targeting of civilians on the road, while travelling, and the targeting of civilians by the use of indiscriminate bombs. This element of Palestinian policy and practice marks an important point of distinction between the actions of the two sides. Whereas Palestinians civilians alleged to have been injured by Israeli action have by-and-large been actively engaged or caught up in the confrontation with Israel, Israeli civilians injured in the conflict have in the overwhelming majority of cases been targeted simply because they were Israelis.
  48. The pattern of attacks has been disturbing. Israeli residential areas have been the subject of on-going attack, often at night. The repeated attacks on Gilo, a residential neighbourhood of Jerusalem, from Beit Jalla are the best, but not the only, examples of such incidents. The same is true also for settlements on the West Bank. Israelis have been targeted while travelling, going about their private business, to and from settlements in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Invariably, these are attacks without warning in which civilians suddenly find themselves the targets - a molotov cocktail thrown through a car window setting a baby on fire; a school teacher murdered on her way to classes. The list goes on.
  49. Perhaps most disturbing, but sadly not unfamiliar, has been the bus and car bomb attacks - the bombing of a children's school bus in Kfar Darom on 20 November 2000; the car bomb attack on a crowded street in Jerusalem on 2 November 2000; the car bomb in Hadera on 22 November 2000. In each case, the attacks were aimed at civilians, including children, and left many dead and wounded.
  50. There is an element of barbarism in all this. These are not civilians caught up in the cross-fire. These are not civilians actively engaged in some way in the confrontation. These are simply innocent people targeted because they were Israelis. They were "soft" targets. They were victims of terrorism. Unfortunately, the targeting of such individuals has been an active element of Palestinian policy and practice over recent weeks.

  51.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (vi) Attacks on and the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites

  52. The special status under the Agreements of various Jewish Holy Sites situated within areas under Palestinian control has already been addressed. These include notably Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and the Shalom al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho. In the case of these sites, subject to special arrangements allowing for a limited Israeli security presence, their protection was the responsibility of the Palestinian Police. Other sites of importance for present purposes include in particular Rachel's Tomb on the outskirts of Bethlehem.
  53. In the case of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, the site was the target of violent attack from the outset by armed militia, including members of the Palestinian Police, accompanied by significant numbers of stone throwers and others. In one such attack, on 1 October 2000, an Israeli border policeman, Madhat Yosef, was severely injured. He subsequently bled to death following the refusal by Palestinian officials to allow his medical evacuation and the decision by Israeli troops to hold back from entering the area to affect a rescue in order not to inflame the situation further.
  54. With a view to reducing tension in the area, an agreement was subsequently reached between the IDF and the Palestinian Police whereby the few Israeli personnel on duty at the site would be withdrawn and the Palestinian Police would ensure the site's continued protection and preservation.
  55. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli personnel on 7 October 2000, the site was overrun with the support of the Palestinian Police. The Tomb was set ablaze and severely damaged as Palestinians attempted physically to destroy it stone by stone. Images of this attack are shown on the orientation video attached as Exhibit I hereto. Holy relics were burned. The Tomb was painted green, a colour holy to Islam, in preparation for turning the site into a mosque. It was only in the face of widespread international condemnation that this activity was halted.
  56. A similar situation occurred with the Shalom al Yisrael Synagogue in Jericho which was the target of attack on 12 October 2000. The Synagogue was sacked. Holy books and relics were publicly burned. An ancient mosaic was damaged.
  57. In the case of Rachel's Tomb, although this is not situated in an area under Palestinian control, it directly abuts the Palestinian city of Bethlehem, an area (designated A) which is fully under Palestinian jurisdiction. While Israel retains security responsibility for Rachel's Tomb, the constant shooting by Palestinian snipers, rock throwing and general violence in the direction of the Tomb from Palestinian controlled areas has made reasonable use of the site impossible.
  58. In this review, account must not be left out of the Western Wall, the holiest site of Judaism, situated at the foot of the Temple Mount. Following the outbreak of violence at the Temple Mount on 29 September 2000, the area of the Western Wall was the subject of violent attack by some of the 22,000 members of the congregation at Friday prayers. Of the eve of the Jewish new year, the area of the Western Wall had to be evacuated of Jewish worshippers. Following the attack, the entire area was virtually carpeted in rocks.
  59. The attacks on and destruction of Jewish Holy Sites has been another deeply disturbing element of Palestinian policy and practice in the course of the recent violence. There is no doubt that it has been orchestrated and has had official sanction. These attacks have sent a signal to Israelis and to Jews the world over that the Palestinians are not interested in coexisting with Israel. They are intent on destroying that which is most holy to Judaism. They give tangible expression to the calls, broadcast repeatedly on the Palestinian media for a jihad, a holy war, against the Jews.

  60.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (vii) The abuse of protective symbols and of accepted principles relating to the relief of the wounded

  61. There have been many allegations throughout this conflict of the abuse of protective symbols and of accepted principles relating to the relief of the wounded. One such case is that just mentioned of the Israeli border policeman who was wounded in the Palestinian attack on Joseph's Tomb in Nablus on 1 October 2000. As a consequence of the refusal by the Palestinian Police to allow his medical evacuation, he bled to death.
  62. Israel has been very disturbed by other incidents of a similar nature as well as of the serious abuse by the Palestinian side of the Red Crescent relief symbol. On 31 October 2000, gunfire was directed at the Israeli settlement of Psagot from inside the Red Crescent building in Ramallah. In other incidents, Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances were used to bring armed Palestinian militia and police to the frontline in the course of gun battles between Palestinian militia and Israeli soldiers. In yet other cases, ambulances carrying the Israeli Magen David Adom (Star of David) symbol have been the target of attack.

  63.  

     
     
     
     
     

    C. Conclusions in respect of this part

  64. In overview, the policies and practices of the Palestinian side in the present conflict have had a number of significant and highly disturbing features. They have involved significant live-fire attacks by heavily armed militia, at times with support from Palestinian policemen, often from within or behind crowds of stone throwing "civilians", including children. The scope and severity of these attacks have effectively turned the confrontation into an armed conflict. Children have been used quite consciously as part of the campaign. Attacks have been targeted directly at Israeli civilians otherwise entirely uninvolved in the confrontation. Attacks have also exhibited a barbarism that has conveyed clear signals of the nature of the threat faced by Israelis. This has been reinforced by the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites.
  65. The groundwork for these actions has been laid, directly or indirectly, over a long period of non-compliance by the PLO and the Palestinian Authority with their obligations under the various agreements with Israel - the use of hostile propaganda and incitement to violence, the military training of young children, the amassing of an armory of illegal weapons, the release of terrorist detainees. Israel has not initiated confrontation. It has responded in self-defence.
* * *
PART VII

ISRAELI POLICIES AND PRACTICES

  1. Israel has been accused of using excessive force in response to the on-going Palestinian attacks of the past 93 days. The basis for the accusation is invariably the unspoken perception that the numerical imbalance in casualties on the two sides must necessarily be a consequence of excessive Israeli force. Israel's detractors also point to the number of Palestinian children casualties in support of this claim.
  2. To Israel's regret, although not altogether to its surprise, these claims have been made on the basis of little careful investigation into the matter or, where there has been investigation, in the apparent absence, evident on the face of the reports in question, of an appreciation of certain basic aspects of the conflict and of Israel's response. Israel sees little balance, for example, in the condemnation, in Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000) of 7 October 2000, of "acts of violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians, resulting in injury and loss of life."
  3. Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000 adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights at a special session convened to address the violence is equally troubling. Under the title "[g]rave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel", the Commission inter alia condemned
  4. "the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force in violation of international humanitarian law by the Israeli occupying Power against innocent and unarmed Palestinian civilians, causing the death of 120 civilians, including many children, in the occupied territories, which constitutes a flagrant and grave violation of the right to life and also constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity."
  5. Frankly, the Commission on Human Rights does not cover itself in glory with this Resolution. It was adopted in the absence of any investigation into the facts. This is evident from the terms of the Resolution itself, which saw the Commission decide to establish an inquiry into the facts and request the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to undertake an urgent visit "to take stock of the violations". The Resolution makes no reference to Palestinian attacks against Israelis, the lynching of the Israeli reservists in Ramallah the preceding week, the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites, or any other Palestinian action targeting Israelis.
  6. The Report of Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, issued on 27 November 2000, is commendably balanced in some respects but fundamentally flawed in key elements. There is virtually no review of the circumstances of the conflict or of the reality of the Palestinian attacks against Israelis. There are fundamental inaccuracies and shortcomings in the assessment concerning Israel's use of force. There is virtually no reference to live-fire attacks by Palestinians. There is no appreciation of the role played by children either in prosecuting violence directly or as part of Palestinian live-fire confrontations with Israeli troops. There are recommendations that codes of conduct relating to civilian law enforcement operations should apply but there is no analysis or apparent appreciation of the reality of the conflict or of the specific application of either these codes or of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, which was also referred to, to the circumstances in issue.
  7. There are other reports by other organisations, many of which will no doubt find their way to the Committee. It is not Israel's intention here, within the limits of this Statement, to address each of these, although, if warranted, it will be happy to do so in due course. The reason for highlighting the preceding points is simply by way of cautionary comment to the Committee. There is a good deal of information out there. Much of it is subject to significant limitation.

  8.  

     
     
     
     
     

    A. The nature of the conflict

  9. The point has already been made but merits repetition. Israel is engaged in an armed conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is characterised by live-fire attacks on a significant scale, both quantitatively and geographically - around 2,700 such attacks over the entire area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The attacks are carried out by a well-armed and organised militia, under the command of the Palestinian political establishment, operating from areas outside Israeli control. To date, around 500 Israelis have been injured in the conflict and 39 killed. Insofar as it is possible to establish, around 292 Palestinians have been killed and around 9,000 injured.
  10. The key to a balanced appreciation of the circumstances that have prevailed over the past 93 days is that the live-fire dimension of the Palestinian attacks have decisively taken containment of the conflict out of the realm of civilian riot control. This is examined in more detail below. For present purposes, the issue is simply that, in the face of live-fire attacks, non-lethal methods of containment cannot be effectively deployed.
  11. The point is starkly illustrated by analogy with two events which, although very different from those with which the Committee is concerned, nevertheless contain points of similarity. The events in question are the riots in Los Angeles from 29 April to 4 May 1992 and the UN peacekeeping Operation Restore Hope in Somalia during the period June - November 1993. Other examples are also apparent but these will suffice to illustrate the point.
  12. The background to the events in Los Angeles was the beating of Rodney King, an African-American, by officers from the Los Angeles Police Department, an incident captured on film and broadcast on American television. The officers in question were put on trial. Their subsequent acquittal led to riots which began on the afternoon of 29 April 1992. The riots ended five days later on the morning of 4 May 1992.
  13. During the course of those five days, 54 people were killed, 2,383 people were injured, 221 of these critically, and 13,212 people were arrested. Containment of the riot was initially placed in the hands of the National Guard, which deployed around 10,500 troops. The operation was subsequently brought under the command of the US army, which deployed a further 2,000 troops and 1,500 marines, making a total military contingent of around 14,000.
  14. The tactics adopted by the troops, and their state of readiness for civilian riot control, has been heavily criticised. The problems associated with the containment of urban lawlessness of the kind seen in Los Angeles has also been much commented upon. One aspect which caused particular problems for the troops was the use of handguns by a number of the rioters.
  15. The circumstances with which the Committee is concerned are infinitely more complex and difficult to manage than those which pertained in Los Angeles. Israeli troops are coming under direct attack from a heavily armed and well-organised militia. The live-fire dimension is incomparably greater and more lethal. The express intention on the part of the attackers is to cause injury and death to their Israeli targets. The attackers operate from areas beyond Israeli jurisdiction. They are under the command of a well-developed political establishment.
  16. The two situations are not ultimately analogous. There is a measure of distaste in a comparison of casualty statistics. If, however, the pattern of casualties in Los Angeles had been repeated in the present conflict, the number of dead would have exceeded 1,100 and those injured would have been in excess of 45,000.
  17. The second example is that of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, during the period June - November 1993. Once again, this is not strictly analogous to the present situation. It does, however, contain important parallels.
  18. Following the disintegration of Somalia into warring factions in 1991, the United Nations sent in a multinational peacekeeping force with the object of restoring law and order to the country, distributing food, disarming the militia and restoring civilian rule. A significant component of that force came from the United States. A further 25 states contributed troops.
  19. The violence, involving organised militia groups operating in tandem with large numbers of "civilians", proved difficult to contain. The live-fire dimension of militia attacks made the effective deployment of non-lethal methods of containment impossible.
  20. Referring to an incident on 6 June 1993 in which the forces of General Aidid, one of the Somali faction leaders, shielded by a cordon of civilians, attacked a small UN contingent of Pakistani soldiers, the New York Times on 8 June 1993 reported as follows:
  21. "One or two men approached the soldiers and began to talk to them as 15 or so walked toward them, their hands behind their backs ... Women and children then surrounded the Pakistanis ... blocking them from shooting at the men, who pulled out sticks and knives as other Somalis on nearby rooftops opened fire."
  22. Twenty-three Pakistani soldiers of the UN peacekeeping force were killed in the attack.
  23. The UN forces responded by attacking General Aidid's headquarters. Reports suggested that more than 60 Somalis were killed and around 100 wounded in the initial attack. The situation escalated subsequently resulting in the death of a further 20 Somali civilian demonstrators. The UN envoy in Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe reportedly laid the blame for the civilian deaths at General Aidid's door indicating that he was using women and children as shields for his gunmen.
  24. On 12 July 1993, the UN force attacked an Aidid command and control centre. Associated Press reported the use of helicopters. Agence France Presse reported 54 Somalis killed and 174 wounded. Four journalists reporting on the events were killed by a Somali mob.
  25. On 9 September 1993, a Somali contingent attacked a US bulldozer crew. UN troops came to the rescue. Around 100 Somalis were killed in the ensuing battle. An account from one of the US units involved in the action described the situation in the following terms:
  26. "... the Cobras [US helicopters] killed as many as 100, they were shooting into crowds where they were taking fire. Remember it was a free fire zone ... [The Somalis] will use women as cover and concealment for when they shoot at us to make it harder to see who is doing the shooting, if we can see them at all. Then they call us killers of women and children when we shoot at the very same people who are shooting at us and we kill some of the people that they are using for cover."
  27. As has been previously quoted, UN Military Spokesman Major David Stockwell was reported to have defended the action in the following terms:
  28. "Everyone on the ground in the vicinity was a combatant, because they meant to do us harm."
  29. A further significant confrontation took place on 3 October 1993 when US troops came under attack from General Aided's militia. Reports varied from 300 to 500 killed and thousands injured. A US army spokesman denied excessive use of force describing the situation in the following terms:
  30. "It has been our experience that the Somali gunmen who have opposed us have frequently used women and children and, at times, have worn women's clothing, to cover their movements and to protect them from attack. These gunmen do not wear uniforms or distinctive insignia; they do not carry arms openly; they are not led by accountable military leadership; they are not subject to military discipline and they do not comply with international law. It is they who initiated the firefight and who bear ultimate responsibility for this tragic loss of life."
  31. The two situations - Somalia and the West Bank and Gaza Strip - are not the same. The events in Somalia, however, illustrate starkly the difficulties faced by troops confronted by an armed militia attacking from within crowds of unarmed civilians. The involvement of civilians is calculated. The threat to the troops under attack is evident. Traditional non-lethal methods of riot control are ineffective. Casualties are invariably high. They are a calculated part of the strategy of the attacking force.
  32. Before leaving this element, it ought to be emphasised that Israel is not seeking to downplay the scale of the casualties in the present conflict. Nor, it must also be emphasised, is Israel suggesting that individual instances of excessive response may not have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal equation. A few, often geographically isolated, Israeli troops under attack by Palestinian militia operating from within a sizeable and invariably extremely violent "civilian" contingent that is intent on causing injury and death.
  33. The IDF, in common with other equivalent armed forces worldwide, operates on the basis of military discipline. Infractions of Rules of Engagement and codes of conduct are treated severely. Where Israel considers that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does so, although, given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so routinely. The IDF and the Israeli political establishment do not condone and will not overlook excessive and unreasonable use of force by its troops. Equally, however, and this too should be emphasised, the IDF and the Israeli political establishment will not lightly second-guess the judgement of its troops under attack. Let there be no misunderstandings on this point.
  34. The issue of alleged unlawful action by Israeli settlers against Palestinians also requires comment. There have been a number of allegations by Palestinians of criminal conduct on the part of Israelis, invariably in the vicinity of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These include attacks on Palestinian vehicles causing personal injury and damage, live-fire attacks against Palestinians resulting in death and injury, and the destruction of property.
  35. All such allegations are investigated. Israel will have no truck with criminal activity on the part of its nationals. In a number of cases to date, suspects have been remanded in custody pending trial.

  36.  

     
     
     
     
     

    B. The use of force by Israel

  37. There are four issues that warrant comment in respect of the use of force by Israel in the context of the present conflict: (i) the shortcomings of non-lethal means of containment, (ii) the means deployed by Israeli forces, (iii) the issue of targeting, and (iv) the use of heavy weapons such as tanks and helicopters. These issues are addressed in turn below. For completeness, it should be stated that Israel does not propose, in the present Statement, to address the issue of non-forcible measures taken by Israel in the context of the present situation which have had an economic impact. As indicated in President Clinton's letter to Senator Mitchell quoted at the outset of this Statement, the principal focus of the Committee's work is "on the problems of violent confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians". While Israel has no wish to preclude inquiry by the Committee into broader issues concerning "the policies and practices of the two sides during the crisis", including its economic aspects, this latter element is not at the core of the Committee's task. Israel would, however, be happy to address this broader dimension in future submissions to the Committee. For the avoidance of doubt, it should, however, be stated that Israel has only taken non-forcible measures where these have been required for reasons of security.
  38. Before turning to address the particular issues concerning the use of force, the central features of the present conflict warrant brief repetition. The conflict is characterised by live-fire attacks by Palestinian militia, including, often, from elements of the Palestinian Police, against Israeli civilians and civilian targets and Israeli forces. These attacks have involved the use of pistols, assault rifles, sub-machines guns, machine guns, grenades and explosives. There have been around 2,700 such attacks over the course of the conflict, averaging around 28 attacks for each of the 93 days since the violence began.
  39. The live-fire attacks invariably take place from within or behind groups of "civilians". The usual modus operandi of the incidents involves an attack by a sizeable Palestinian contingent against small numbers of Israelis, often geographically isolated. Most of the attacks involve the Palestinian contingent travelling to "engage" their intended Israeli targets. Many of the attacks are barbaric in their methods and outcome.

  40.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (i) The shortcomings of non-lethal means of containment

  41. A central element of the "charge" that has been levelled against Israel is that it did not use - or made insufficient use of - non-lethal means of containment with the consequence that many Palestinian injuries that might otherwise have been avoided in fact occurred. With due respect to all those who have advanced this point, they know not of what they speak. Where possible, Israel has deployed non-lethal means. This has not always been possible. More important is the fact that virtually all of the non-lethal means available are ineffective and unsuitable for use in the kind of conflict prosecuted by the Palestinians. The one exception to this is the use of rubber bullets. These have been widely employed by Israeli forces. However, as the circumstances of the present conflict attest, the use of rubber bullets can in some circumstances be lethal.
  42. The nature of the present conflict has posed two related difficulties for Israel in its attempt to contain the violence and minimise casualties. First, the use of live-fire by the Palestinians has effectively meant that Israeli forces have had to remain at some distance from those initiating the violence. Second, the threat of force against Israelis has been a threat of lethal force. Both factors have inhibited the use of traditional methods of riot control. Coupled with this, intrinsic, technical shortcomings or problems associated with the use of available non-lethal means has significantly limited the options open to Israel.
  43. In the light of concerns over the possibility of a violent confrontation with the Palestinians, and with the object of avoiding large-scale loss of life and serious injury, Israel has investigated the availability of effective non-lethal means of containment very closely. In every case bar one (addressed further below), it has come to the conclusion that the available means are either fundamentally unsuited to a live-fire conflict having the characteristics of the present confrontation or that their use poses a substantial risk of death or serious injury such as to preclude deployment. The specific details are as follows.
  44. Non-lethal means of containment can be categorised under a number of general headings as follows: (i) kinetic weapons, (ii) chemical means, (iii) means of detention, (iv) electric shock weapons, (v) wide and quantitative dispersion devices, and (vi) acoustic weapons. Other forms of non-lethal technology - such as sticky foam, anti-traction measures, etc - are being developed, notably by the US army, but are not currently available for use. The following is a summary of the various types of non-lethal means examined by Israel in its investigations and the shortcomings and risks associated with each.

  45.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (i) Kinetic weapons:

    1. rubber bullets - these have a relatively short effective range. The rubber pellets have a metal core. The launcher for the pellets cannot be attached to all types of weapons. Below 20 metres, the impact of the projectile can cause serious injury, especially if this involves a direct hit to the area of the head. The projectiles, similar in size and shape to a shot-gun cartridge, disperse into a number of parts after firing - in part to slow velocity. Due to their form and means of dispersal, the accuracy of these projectiles decreases over longer ranges;
    2. sponge, rubber and other kinds of pellets - these have an effective range of 5 - 20 metres. Below this range they are unstable and may be lethal. Beyond 20 metres they are totally ineffective. The ammunition suffers from significant problems of accuracy and dispersion;

    3.  

       
       
       
       
       

      (ii) Chemical means:

    4. CS cartridges (tear gas) - this is widely used worldwide. This has a maximum effective range of around 150 metres. A direct hit by a cartridge at short range (up to around 20 metres) may cause serious injury. The effectiveness of the tear gas is dependent on weather conditions. It will, for example, be quickly dispersed in windy conditions. Rioters may also, and do, take a variety of measures to minimise the effect of the tear gas by, for example, wearing masks or goggles and covering the nose and mouth with wet cloth to restrict inhalation. Inhalation of the tear gas may cause injury but this is unlikely to be severe;
    5. OC spray (pepper) - this is very effective but is controversial and not widely approved for use. The literature suggests that it is potentially dangerous. Israel does permit its use;
    6. stun grenades - these are effective over long ranges but are fired at high velocity. A direct hit is likely to cause serious injury. They are not suitable for use against crowds;
    7. BMI (malodorous substances) - delivery systems for such substances are problematic. Small quantities of such substances are ineffective. The concentrations necessary to be effective are hazardous to those who come into direct contact with it;
    8. smoke grenades - the use of such weapons in closed areas may result in serious lung damage. The effective duration of the smoke cloud is short (around one minute). Effectiveness also depends on weather conditions such as wind direction and strength;

    9.  

       
       
       
       
       

      (iii) Means of detention:

    10. entrapment net - this captures and detains. It has an effective range of around 15 metres against small groups only;

    11.  

       
       
       
       
       

      (iv) Electric shock weapons:

    12. taser gun - this stuns its target immediately and neutralises for up to half-an-hour. As this works by use of wire electrodes, it has a very short range (around 7 metres). It requires a new cartridge for every target. There are claims that it may cause lasting physiological damage;

    13.  

       
       
       
       
       

      (iii) Wide and quantitative dispersion devices:

    14. launchers for CS gas, smoke, stun grenades, etc - such systems are under development and are not available for current use. The intrinsic limitations of the relevant projectile applies. Such a launcher would have an effective range of up to 350 metres. As the projectiles are fired at high velocity, a direct hit may cause serious injury;
    15. multi-barrel powder launcher - this is capable of dispensing a large quantity of powder over a range of 20 - 200 metres. In development demonstrations by the manufacturers, participants were seriously injured as a result by the direct hit of a solid mass of the substance that had not been dispersed during flight. In its present form, the proposed system is potentially lethal;
    16. aerial launched capabilities - this was developed and used by Israel during the intifada of the late 1980s. It is capable of launching various non-lethal means from low altitude from helicopters. At the effective launching altitude, the helicopters are, however, extremely vulnerable to ground fire. The system cannot therefore be used in the present conflict;
    17. water cannon - these are well-tried internationally but are only effective at relatively short ranges and against small groups;

    18.  

       
       
       
       
       

      (vi) Acoustic weapons:

    19. acoustic and ultrasonic sirens - these are effective but those available internationally only have a range of around 20 metres.
  46. In only one case has Israel been able to identify non-lethal technology that may be effectively deployed over relatively long distances and wide areas and the use of which does not pose a lethal threat. This is the case of the French made MP7 hand held tear gas launcher. Each discharge disperses seven projectiles of CS gas over a range of around 170 metres. Up to 12 rounds can be launched simultaneously or continuously. They can be launched from the ground or from a vehicle. Despite Israeli requests, including through diplomatic channels, the French Government has refused to authorise the purchase of this technology by Israel.
  47. As the preceding indicates, non-lethal methods of containment are subject to significant limitations. These are particular acute in circumstances such as those in issue in the present conflict. It is the nature of the Palestinian attacks against Israelis that has very largely determined the range of available responses open to Israel. In circumstances in which the use of non-lethal means has been possible and would be likely to be effective, this option has been followed. It is, however, entirely fanciful to suggest that a greater use of non-lethal means by Israel would have been effective either in containing the conflict or in reducing the number of casualties beyond current levels.

  48.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (ii) The means deployed by Israeli forces

  49. An essential characteristic of the present conflict is that Israeli civilians and armed forces have been attacked by Palestinians. In some circumstances, such attacks have been predictable and it has been possible for Israel to plan defensive measures. In many cases, attacks have not been predictable and it has accordingly been less easy to plan a response. In a few instances, Israel has initiated action in response to a direct attack from the other side.
  50. Where it has been possible to anticipate an attack, the circumstances are such that non-lethal means are likely to be an effective response, and where such means have been available to the troops concerned, Israel has employed such means. Overwhelmingly, the non-lethal means used have been tear gas and rubber bullets. As will be appreciated, the use of such means is not free from risk and in many cases injuries have resulted. In the main, such injuries are unlikely to have been life threatening or to have caused any long term disability. Although accurate figures are impossible to come by, independent sources have suggested that around 70% of Palestinian injuries have been caused by the use of rubber bullets (40%) and tear gas (30%). Assuming, for present purposes, the broad accuracy of these percentages, this is consistent with the proposition that Israeli forces have wherever possible used non-lethal means of containment.
  51. Where Israeli forces have come under attack and the circumstances have been such that the use of non-lethal means has not been possible - surprise attack, the likely ineffectiveness of non-lethal means, the risk of serious injury by their use, or their lack of availability - they have acted in self-defence by the use of live-fire. The use of such measures has been consistent with the scale of the threat and the nature of the attack. The suggestion is that around 20% of Palestinian injuries have been the result of the use of such means.
  52. In a few instances, Israel has initiated action in response to a direct attack from the other side. In a number of cases, this has involved the use of heavy weapons from helicopters and tanks. These have been exceptional measures. The attacks were in many cases preceded by warnings for purposes of avoiding injury. Most cases in which tanks have been used have involved the use of so-called "hollow" shells designed minimise personal injury. This aspect is addressed separately below.

  53.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iii) Rules of Engagement and the issue of targeting

  54. For armed forces the world over, the use of weapons in response to attack is addressed in the Rules of Engagement ("ROEs"). Drawn up by reference to the applicable rules of international law and the exigencies of the circumstances, ROEs specify the situation in which a member of the armed forces is permitted, and in some cases required, to use his or her weapon and the limitations and conditions relevant to such use. ROEs differ according to the type of conflict that is being addressed, the tactical situation that is likely to arise and the general legal-strategic situation. Due to their sensitive nature - knowledge of the applicable ROEs may give the opposing force a significant advantage - States do not publish their ROEs. ROEs are implemented through instructions to officers and soldiers in the field.
  55. The present confrontation is one of armed conflict short of war. This notwithstanding, the IDF took a decision at an early stage not to significantly revise the ROEs that had applied to the operation of Israeli forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to the commencement of the violence. This authorised the use of weapons solely in life-threatening situations or, subject to significant limitations, in the exercise of the arrest of an individual suspected of having committed a grave security offence. This being said, some revision of the ROEs was undertaken to reflect the reality of the circumstances faced by Israeli troops. In addition, clarifications were made with regard to the definition of life threatening situations. In all cases, IDF activities have been governed by an overriding policy of restraint, the requirement of proportionality and the necessity to take all possible measures to prevent harm to innocent civilians.
  56. Pursuant to its applicable ROEs, Israeli troops have responded to those who have initiated attacks against Israeli civilians or forces or those who have been about to initiate such attacks. In a number of cases, Israel has initiated action against Palestinian command and control positions relevant to the conduct of attacks against Israelis. As previously observed, in a limited number of cases, Israel has focused such action on points geographically distinct from the source of the original attack, an initiative permitted under accepted rules relating to targeting in armed conflict.
  57. Two allegations that have been made arising out of the present conflict are that injuries appear frequently to have been caused to the upper body of the injured and that children and others have been killed by the use of rubber bullets. A number of observations on these allegations are warranted. First, it is important to state that Israel has no way of knowing whether these allegations are true and, if they are, the numbers involved in each case. The observations that follow proceed on the assumption, for purposes of this analysis, that the allegations have some basis. Israel nevertheless reserves its position on the matter pending any submissions that may be put forward by the Palestinian side on this point.
  58. Second, the allegation that injuries have been caused to the upper body of those injured forms an essential basis for the claim that Israel has used excessive force; that it has set out to kill or seriously injure the persons concerned.
  59. Those who make this allegation have a fundamental lack of appreciation of the circumstances in which the alleged injuries are likely to have occurred. The reality is that, where such injuries have occurred, they are likely to have occurred in highly fluid situations of extreme threat, involving heavy exchanges of gunfire, often over extended periods, in which the person injured is likely to have been moving actively at the point at which the injury was sustained. To these elements must also be added other complicating factors such as distance, limitations on the accuracy of weapons, etc.
  60. With these factors in mind it is incorrect to suggest that injuries sustained to the upper body indicate an intention to kill or cause serious injury. Such injuries illustrate little apart from the severity of the battle in question.
  61. Third, as to the allegation that children and others may have been killed by rubber bullets, sadly, this is possible. As has already been observed, rubber bullets may be lethal in some circumstances such as at close range or if they strike at particular points on the body.
  62. The reality is that rubber bullets are an imperfect means of containment. They are designed to minimise the risk of serious injury but they cannot alleviate it altogether. The reality is that in the overwhelming majority of cases rubber bullets do not cause death or serious injury. In many circumstances, they may be the only available option short of live-fire. Children using guns, or intent on causing injury or death to their intended target by some other means, pose a lethal threat. Particularly when that threat takes the form of large-scale attack, there are few choices when it comes to containment.
  63. Fourth, it is worth observing that, in the midst of confrontation, it is often impossible to distinguish older children from adults. This is the hazard of a conflict involving militia forces which operate without uniforms or other distinguishing elements. A soldier coming under lethal attack has not the luxury of asking his or her attacker for proof of age.

  64.  

     
     
     
     
     

    (iv) The use of heavy weapons such as tanks and helicopters

  65. As has already been observed, in a limited number of cases the IDF has resorted to the use of helicopters and tanks. This has invariably followed attacks of particular brutality by the Palestinian side such as the lynching in Ramallah and the Kfar Darom bus bombing. A number of observations are warranted about the use of such weapons.
  66. First, such weapons are used because of their particular accuracy. In contrast, for example, to the use of aircraft where the potential for damage beyond the immediate confines of the target (so-called "collateral damage") is greater, tanks and helicopters are able to pinpoint targets with precision. Their use is therefore designed to minimise injury in circumstances in which a higher scale of response is warranted by the level of the initial Palestinian attack.
  67. Second, in many cases, the IDF gave timely and detailed warnings of impending action of this nature with the aim of forestalling personal injury. By-and-large, the intention of such attacks has not been to cause injury. It has been to destroy command and control centres or other military targets and to send a signal of Israeli capability to the Palestinian leadership. In the light of such warnings, many of these attacks have resulted in no or only minimal injury.
  68. Examples of actions in which warnings were provided include the helicopter attacks on the Fatah Headquarters in Bet Lahiya on 12 October 2000 and on the police station in Ramallah in which the two Israeli reservists were lynched earlier that day. In both cases, the targets were damaged. There was no loss of life. In another case, the Fatah office in Nablus was attacked on 30 October 2000 following a Palestinian terrorist attack in Jerusalem and the discovery of the body of an Israeli civilian near Gilo. Warnings were given. There was no loss of life. In yet another case, various attacks were initiated on 15 November 2000 against Fatah offices in Tulkarm, Salfit and Hebron following the killing of two Israeli soldiers and a civilian. Warnings were given in each case.
  69. Third, most of the cases in which tanks and helicopters have been used have been in response to on-going live-fire attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians carried out from buildings or other fortified locations. In such circumstances, the use of such weapons is the only effective way in which to respond.
  70. Fourth, as regards the use of tanks, in many cases in which this has occurred the ammunition used has been so-called "hollow shells", ie shells in which the charge does not have a radius effect over a wide area therefore minimising the risk of personal injury. The object of these actions has been to destroy locations from which attacks have taken place with the minimum risk of personal injury.

  71.  

     
     
     
     
     

    C. Conclusions in respect of this part

  72. The present conflict is not of Israel's making. Israel would like to see an end to the violence and a successful conclusion to the peace negotiations. Israeli civilians, police and armed forces have, however, been coming under sustained attack for 93 days. A commensurate response to these attacks is warranted.
  73. Given the scale and effects of the Palestinian attacks, Israel has acted in a measured and responsible manner. The acts of its military and police forces have been directed, within the severe constraints of the events in which they were caught, to containing the confrontation, protecting persons not directly involved in the conflict and their property, avoiding casualties to themselves and minimising as far as possible serious injury to those actively engaged on the other side. There has been no excessive use of force on Israel's part.

  74.  

     
     
     
     
     
     
     

* * *

PART VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF VIOLENCE

  1. A central element of the Committee's task is to make recommendations on how to prevent the recurrence of the violence of recent weeks. Its function in this respect is to facilitate the bilateral negotiations process. In the words of President Clinton, the work of the Committee "should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future."
  2. The Committee's task in this respect is delicate. As President Clinton also indicated, the Committee "should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination". As was noted at the outset of this Statement, the Committee's role is not to make wider recommendations for a settlement between the Parties. Its task relates to the present violence, not the settlement of the wider Palestinian - Israeli dispute. The following proposals reflect this appreciation of the Committee's task.
  3. The fundamental precondition in the recreation of trust between the Parties is that previously agreed arrangements between the two sides must be upheld. This includes in particular those elements of the agreements that concern security and security cooperation. The only basis on which to move forward is the full and effective implementation of the agreements already concluded between the Parties.
  4. Given the events of recent weeks, Israel considers it essential that the Palestinian side reaffirm its clearly stated and documented obligations to renounce the use of force in its relations with Israel. The basic commitment underlying the Oslo Process was expressed in the Exchange of Notes between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in which the PLO committed itself "to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides" and declared that "all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations".
  5. This commitment needs new life. There can be no resort to violence in order to solve issues in dispute or further political interests. Measures designed to prevent the use of violence and to apprehend and prosecute individuals involved in incitement and in the perpetration of or conspiracy to commit acts of violence must therefore be enforced. Previously agreed, on-the-ground arrangements, which were specially devised by the two sides to uphold security and to maintain security cooperation and coordination, must therefore be reinstated and reinvigorated.
  6. These mechanisms include those established pursuant to the Wye River Memorandum, in particular, the Trilateral Security Cooperation Committee, the Anti-Incitement Committee, and mechanisms designed to monitor the release of prisoners, the collection of illegal weapons and the prevention of terror. These mechanisms must be reinstated with a commitment to ensure that they work in an efficient manner.
  7. It should be understood that the point of departure for any positive change in relations between Israel and the Palestinians must be the achievement of a durable cessation of violence. In this connection, Israel considers that the Palestinian side must adopt certain concrete steps designed to send a clear message of intent both to the Israeli leadership and the general public. These measures would include the following:
    1. a publicized reaffirmation by the Palestinian leadership, both written and spoken, affirming its commitment to resolve disputes with Israel by peaceful means. This message, which should be addressed to the Palestinian public, should include a clear renunciation and denunciation of any recourse to violence and terrorism;
    2. the institution of measures to:
      • return to prison persons involved in terrorist activities against Israel;
      • collect weapons held in contravention of agreements with Israel;
      • stop and prevent the para-military training of youth and children; and
      • resume preventive security cooperation with Israel;
    3. an obligation to institute active steps to prevent anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement in the media, in places of worship and in educational institutions. These steps must be accompanied by a conscientious attempt to institute and encourage the widespread dissemination of values and principles supporting peaceful coexistence. In this context, it is suggested that both Parties work together to enhance the dialogue and relations between their peoples within the framework of the People-to-People Programme established under the Interim Agreement;
    4. the reduction of the Palestinian Police to the agreed limit of 30,000. There must be both an official and popular cessation of all training of a military nature undertaken by members of the Palestinian Police. The role of this force is solely to maintain internal security and public order; and
    5. a reaffirmation of its commitment to respect the religious beliefs, the worship practices and the Holy Sites of all persons, including the right to enjoy unimpeded access to their Holy Places.
  8. For its part, Israel would be ready to make simultaneous and reciprocal statements and to take measures that would express its mutual commitment for peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. It would propose a series of confidence building measures, actions which would build the feeling of security and progress on all sides, including:
    1. upon the mutual statements regarding violence, Israel will take action to reposition forces to their positions prior to the recent events and to remove the internal closures of cities;
    2. by an agreed date, Israel will gradually increase, to levels prior to the events of recent weeks, the number of Palestinians permitted to enter Israel for the purpose of employment;
    3. an immediate creation and utilisation of direct lines of communication ("hotlines") between Palestinians and Israelis, both at the leadership and field commander levels; and
    4. a joint call to donor states, and international sponsors, to invest in economic projects aimed at providing employment opportunities, the improvement of the standard of living, and fostering stability in the Palestinian areas.
  9. Within the context of these proposals, Israel believes that the Committee can exert a positive influence on Israeli - Palestinian relations and facilitate the restoration of mutual trust and confidence vital for the continuation of the peace process.
* * *

PART IX

CONCLUSIONS

  1. The present Statement constitutes the initial submission of the Government of Israel on the violence of the past weeks. As will be evident from the Statement, Israel considers that the conflict that has raged for the past 93 days - leaving almost 400 dead and close to 10,000 injured on both sides - is entirely of the Palestinian making. It is a conflict designed to "create new facts on the ground", to recapture the diplomatic initiative. It is violence with a political objective.
  2. The Committee has a delicate task - to report on the violence of recent weeks, its causes and the policies and practices of the Parties, and to recommend ways of preventing the reoccurrence of violence in the future. Israel has faith in the wisdom and judgement of the Committee in this exercise.
  3. As the finishing touches were being put to this Statement - on Thursday, 28 December 2000 - reports were coming in of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat in Sharm El-Sheikh with a view to taking the recent cautious resumption of negotiations in Washington to the next level. As these concluding words are being written - in the Ministry of Defence in Tel Aviv - news reports are coming in of a bus bomb attack some short distance away. The violence must stop. The Palestinian leadership has a responsibility to ensure this.
Moshe Kochanovsky

Designated Israeli Point of Contact
Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee

28 December 2000
 
 
 

LIST OF ANNEXES AND EXHIBITS

Together with this Statement, Israel is also submitting the following Annexes and Exhibit:

Annex I - General Documents (containing documents at Tabs 1 - 34)

Annex II - Maps and Aerial Photographs

Annex III - Exchange of Notes Between the Chairman of the PLO and the Prime Minister of Israel, 9 - 10 September 1993
     - Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993

Annex IV - Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 4 May 1994

Annex V - Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 29 August 1994

Annex VI - Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 27 August 1995

Annex VII - Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995

Annex VIII - Note for the Record, 15 January 1997
     - Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 17 January 1997
     - Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, 21 January 1997

Annex IX - Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998

Annex X - Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September 1999

Annex XI - The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview, July 2000

Exhibit I - Video / CD: Orientation to the Present Conflict

ANNEX I: TABLE OF CONTENTS
Note: Not all of these documents are available on-line.
 
 

Tab 1 - Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, Statement of President Clinton, 17 October 2000

Tab 2 - Letter from President Clinton to Senator Mitchell (undated draft)

Tab 3 - Statement by President Clinton on the Middle East Peace Process, The White House, 25 July 2000

Tab 4 - Interview with US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Washington D.C., 25 July 2000

Tab 5 - Interview with US National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, 26 July 2000

Tab 6 - Thomas L. Friedman, "Arafat's War", New York Times, 13 October 2000

Tab 7 - Abu-Ali Mustafa, Al-Quds, 23 July 2000

Tab 8 - Muqara Al-Tilawa Wa'ahkam Al-Tajwid (Koran Recitement and Rules of Proper Reading)

Tab 9 - Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus Al-Adabia (Reading and Literary Texts)

Tab 10 - Al-Tatbikat Al-Lughawiya (Language Exercises)

Tab 11 - Al-Mutala'ah Wa'alnussus Al-Adabia (Reading and Literary Texts)

Tab 12 - The Times, London, 25 October 2000

Tab 13 - Nagaa Alu-Bakr, Al-Quds, 20 July 2000

Tab 14 - Kul Al-Arab, 14 July 2000

Tab 15 - Abd-Alrazek Al Mujaidah, Reuters, 20 July 2000

Tab 16 - Abu Ala, Reuters, 9 August 2000

Tab 17 - Muhammad Dahlan, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, 16 August 2000

Tab 18 - Muhammad Dahlan, Al-Ayam, 14 September 2000

Tab 19 - Yasser Abed-Rabo, Voice of Palestine, 19 September 2000

Tab 20 - RTL-TV1 (Belgian Television) Reporter, Jean Pierre Martin, 5 October 2000

Tab 21 - Fatah Declaration, Nablus, 6 October 2000

Tab 22 - Al-Ayam, 6 December 2000

Tab 23 - Sakher Habash, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, 7 December 2000

Tab 24 - Hamas, Communique, 27 September 2000

Tab 25 - Address by Sheikh Hian Al-Adrasi, El-Aksa Mosque, Friday, 29 September 2000

Tab 26 - Sermon by Dr Ahmad Abu-Halabia, Zayd bin Sultan Nahyan Mosque, Gaza, 13 October 2000

Tab 27 - Paris Summit, Draft Points of Understanding, 4 October 2000

Tab 28 - Statement by the Prime Minister of Israel, 17 October 2000

Tab 29 - Joint Statement on the Cessation of Violence, 2 November 2000

Tab 30 - Mark Seager, The Sunday Telegraph, 15 October 2000

Tab 31 - "Let Our Kids Alone, Arafat Told", USA Today, 8 December 2000

Tab 32 - Press Release, 1 November 2000, "IDF Condemns Palestinian Use of Red Crescent Facilities to Shoot at Psagot"

Tab 33 - Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000), 7 October 2000

Tab 34 - Resolution S-5/1, 19 October 2000 of the UN Commission on Human Rights

EXHIBIT I: TABLE OF VIDEO CLIPS
 

Clip Counter Date Source Location Description
CHILDREN
1. 00:50 8 October Palestinian Satellite Channel Jerusalem  Cry of a young child
2. 01:40 27 October CBS Ramallah Interview with a 16 year old youth
3. 02:42 13 November Tulkarm Local Television  Tulkarm Interview with young children and lynch game
4. 05:42 20 November BBC Gaza Strip Children's military style camps
5. 07:25 29 November BBC Gaza Strip School song
INCITEMENT
6. 08:30 13 October Palestinian Satellite Channel Gaza Strip Sermon of Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan Mosque, Gaza Strip 
7. 11:53 30 October Palestinian Satellite Channel   TV broadcaster calling for preparations to be made
VIOLENCE
8. 13:17 2 October Palestinian Satellite Channel IDF Post, Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip Violent protests against IDF post
9. 14:12 3 October NBC Gaza Strip and Nablus Palestinian violence
10. 14:41 6 October BBC Jerusalem  Israeli policemen trapped in a police station in the Old City of Jerusalem
11. 15:41 12 October Al-Jazira Satellite Channel Gaza Strip Demonstration 
12. 16:16 12 October BBC Ramallah Lynch
13. 17:27 14 October CNN Gaza Strip Violent Demonstration
14. 18:09 26 October CNN Gaza Strip Suicide bomber at Kfar Darom IDF military post
15. 18:35 27 October CBS Ramallah Interview with Marwan Barghouti
WEAPONS
16. 21:45 12 October Al-Jazira Satellite Channel Jelazun Refugee Camp Illegal weapons, including anti-tank missile
17. 22:05 12 October Palestinian satellite Channel  Gaza Strip  Demonstration with illegal weapons
18. 22:37 17 October CBS West Bank Parade with illegal weapons
19. 23:09 26 October BBC West Bank Suicide bombers
DESECRATION OF HOLY SITES
20. 23:35 7 October CNN Joseph's Tomb Desecration of Joseph's Tomb

 
 
TERROR
21. 24:22 20 October BBC Mount Eyval Shooting on Israeli tourists
22. 24:44 2 November BBC Jerusalem Car bomb in Mahane Yehuda Market - Jerusalem
23. 25:13 13 November CNN Ramallah Shots at civilian car
24. 25:48 20 November IBA Kfar Darom Bombing of children's school bus
25. 26:19 20 November BBC Gilo Damage to private apartment in Gilo
26. 26:41 22 November BBC Gaza Strip Israeli civilian killed in his car at a junction near Kfar Darom
27. 26:58 23 November BBC Hadera Car bomb against bus in Hadera
28. 27:30 23 November BBC Psagot Shots in kitchen window of private apartment in Psagot
29. 28:03 17 November BBC Sharm El-Sheikh Statement of US President Clinton at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit.

 

APPENDIX

MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

This Appendix contains the following maps and aerial photographs for purposes of orientation:
Note: These maps and photos are not currently available on-line.
 
 

Map No.1 - General Orientation Map
(see Israel within Boundaries and Ceasefire Lines - 2000)

Map No.2 - West Bank - Major Flashpoints of Conflict

Map No.3 - Gaza Strip - Major Flashpoints of Conflict

Aerial Photograph No.1 - Temple Mount (showing route of Sharon visit)

Aerial Photograph No.2A - Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip

Aerial Photograph No.2B - Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip

Aerial Photograph No.3A - Ayosh Junction, West Bank

Aerial Photograph No.3B - Ayosh Junction, West Bank

Aerial Photograph No.4 - Gilo - Beit Jalla area

Source:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jcb0

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